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ABSTRACT 
Turkish-American relations date back to the 1800s; however, they were far from 
well developed and did not solidify until the end of World War II. After an alliance of 
fifty years, the Second Iraq War indicated doomsday scenarios in terms of U.S.-Turkish 
relations in the minds of many scholars. The Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the 
proposal of a second Turkish front for American troops in Northern Iraq, as well as, the 
July 4 incident in Sulaymaniyah in 2003, froze the dynamics of the relations.  
Yet, when the history of the relations from the end of World War II until 2003 is 
examined carefully, it should be clear that every time there was a deterioration of the 
mutual relations, they were replaced by a period of improvement, as the common 
interests of both countries outweigh the differences. This thesis aims to show that 
regardless of the level of deterioration, in terms of mutual relations, Turkish-American 
relations are inclined to improve. For this reason, it can be assumed that the deteriorated 
relations of the Second Iraq War will follow the trend toward improvement in the future. 
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This thesis treats the past and present of bilateral relations between Turkey and 
the U.S., mainly after WWII. The main goal of this thesis is to allow a dispassionate 
analysis of these bilateral relations and, the author hopes, to improve the future of these 
relations by examining their history. The immediate past has seen great strain in U.S.-
Turkish relations as a result of the geopolitical turmoil connected with the confluence of 
the Middle East and Europe.  In search of the essence of U.S.-Turkish bi-lateral relations 
in the record of the past,  the author often came across some definite periods of 
deterioration caused by such factors as the international system and domestic politics. 
However, these events were followed by improvement in bi-lateral relations as a result of 
sound statecraft on both sides. Therefore, it could be said that each nation has sought to 
strengthen its ties in spite of period of friction and tension. Since Turkey and the U.S. 
have different geography, interest, power, culture, and so forth, these differences have 
caused deterioration at certain times of crisis. This phenomenon did not, however, end 
with a break of all ties; instead it strengthened relations by reversing itself into an 
improvement period because of enduring interests and sound statecraft. From the author’s 
perspective, this fact demonstrates that the core interests are the same for the two 
countries, but the details of policy and statecraft can and do differ. Hence, enhanced 
interaction and mutual understanding will smooth relations in the end. 
Turkey and the U.S. have been sharing a strategic partnership for nearly 200 
years. The relations between the two countries date back to a treaty of 1830 between the 
U.S. and the Ottoman Empire. However, this agreement failed to improve further 
relations between the two countries. After WWI, a new country, the Republic of Turkey 
was born, yet relations with the U.S. were still weak at this time due to significant 
internal problems in Turkey and the legacy of the recent war in U.S. statecraft. 
Nonetheless, the end of WWII set up the Soviets as the Communist threat in the 




decided to assist the Mediterranean countries in order to impede the Communist effect 
over vulnerable European countries. In this light, the very first seeds of a real alliance 
were cultivated between Turkey and the U.S. in the late 1940s. 
Instead of a true strategic partnership, a “patron-client relationship”1 was 
developed between Turkey and the U.S. from 1945 to 1964. Ankara was the recipient of 
all kind of military supplies from Washington and adjusted its interests in compliance 
with Washington’s goals for NATO policy. Although Ankara was in favor of a complete 
convergence of common interests, some of the interests were too different and proved the 
impossibility of a total convergence between a global power and a regional power. 
However, despite some tough experiences like the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and 
unilateral actions, this period emerged as a time of improvement. After every 
deterioration in the relationship, a period of improvement followed due to critical 
common interests.   
Between 1964 and 1980, the difficulties associated with the evolution of Cyprus 
undermined the relationship. President Johnson’s letter deterring Turkey from executing 
operations in Cyprus was the beginning of the decline in relations until the end of the 
arms embargo in 1978.2 Johnson’s letter pushed Ankara to question its relationship with 
Washington. Therefore, Ankara changed its policy, in this period, toward a policy that 
was less dependent on Washington.  Eventually, the “patron-client relationship” was 
weakened due to Ankara’s attempts at independence. Washington’s pressures on Ankara, 
which related to the reduction of opium production in Turkey, played into Ankara’s 
hands in terms of more independent policies.  Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, the 
relations tracked onto the improvement path again. 
After 1980, the bilateral relations were accelerated and gradually solidified on the 
basis of a strategic partnership perception, which essentially began to be formed in the 
                                                 
1 Nasuh Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003, A History of a Distinctive 
Alliance (NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003), 24. 
2 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Relations, “Turkish-U.S. Political Relations,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/NorthAmerica/USA/USA_Political.htm (accessed 
March 17, 2008). 
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First Iraq War. Clinton’s declarations, indicating the importance of Turkey on the 
strategic partnership basis, brought the two countries closer. 
The September 11 2001 attack on the U.S. was a keystone in the relations. 
Turkey’s efforts against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, and all kinds of terrorism, for twenty 
years, underpinned the importance of partnership in the initiatives against global 
terrorism.3 With this concept, from 1980 to 2003, the relations experienced a phase of 
close cooperation and amicable statecraft.    
Relations, however, became unsustainable again after the second Gulf War with 
the rejection of a resolution by the Turkish parliament on 1 March 2003, regarding the 
approval of a second Turkish front for American troops in Northern Iraq and the 
Sulaymaniyah incident of July 4, where Turkish soldiers had sacks put over their heads 
and were arrested by American soldiers, which created a divergence in the relations. 
Indeed, this was the most sensitive, fragile, and shocking incident during the relationship 
since WWII.  Most of the press organizations and other authors interpreted the strategic 
relationship as having ended. In contrast, as the author of this thesis argues, the relations 
were put on track by both sides again by means of mutual diplomatic and political efforts. 
Political leaders and high-ranking officials made frequent mutual visits in order to 
overcome the problems. Eventually, indications of friendly and strategic tones within the 
relationship, started to slide toward the positive side again.   
These unstable periods of time brought up the question; “How will relations 
between the two countries be in the future?”; “Will these incidents of post-Iraq War cause 
a great antipathy toward Turkish citizens?” A more detailed examination of the past 
relationship between the two countries may enable the U.S. to make correct predictions 
about the future of U.S.-Turkish relations. This thesis aims to make sense of the relations 
between two countries after the Iraq invasion, and to illuminate such diplomacy on the 
basis of history. 
                                                 
3 Rachel Prager, “Turkish-American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues,” Georgetown 
University, 2003, 11. 
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Since there were many ups and downs in the relationship, it is useful to separate 
the chapters according to these periods of crisis and relative amity and unproblematic 
diplomacy.  With this goal in mind, the second chapter takes a look into the period of the 
Cold War in which Turkey was an important partner or client for the U.S. Due to the 
need to contain the Soviet Union, the U.S. organized a strategic plan and undertook some 
actions, including the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. During this time, Turkey 
completely re-adjusted its foreign policy to be in line with Washington’s in terms of a 
real alliance. However, toward the beginning of the 1960s, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
proved that it was impossible for Turkey, as a small state, to completely align its foreign 
policy with a superpower. Fortunately, this was not a real problem as common interests 
were still effective. 
In the third chapter, the events of the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, in which 
the Cyprus Crisis between Greece and Turkey blew up, are explained. Ankara and 
Washington experienced their first significant divergence at this time. The debate over 
Cyprus resulted in a huge disappointment for Turkey, with President Johnson’s letter in 
1964, since Washington had different interests as far as Cyprus as a global power. In 
addition, the demands of the U.S. regarding the reduction of opium production instigated 
a high level of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Yet, reemergence of the Soviet threat by 
means of the Afghanistan invasion and the U.S. embassy incident in Iran demonstrated 
that Washington needed the support of a trustworthy ally in the region: Turkey. Thus, 
concerns secondary to strategic common interests were erased from the bilateral agenda 
once again.   
The fourth chapter mainly discusses the period after the 1980s, in terms of 
improvement in relations, the First Gulf War, operations in the Balkans, and after 9/11. 
Turkish-American relations developed and furthered a very friendly and strategic concept 
in this period. Ankara’s support of Washington in the First Gulf War was extended to the 
fight against terrorism after 9/11, which was essential, as it indicated that that these 
operations were not just against Muslims.   
Lastly, the fifth chapter defines the current situation after the Second Gulf War. 
The rejection of the resolution by the Turkish parliament on March 1, 2003 and the 
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Sulaymaniyah incident were the worst experiences in regards to relations since the letter 
from President Johnson.  Lacking sensitivity, tolerance, and respect for mutual interests 
yielded doomsday for U.S.-Turkish relations. Yet, recall for sensitivity and more  
understanding was taken seriously by the politicians, and boosted the indicator of the 
relations from the bottom to the top. Mutual efforts by politicians achieved the restoration 
of relations to a friendly atmosphere once again. 
As a result, despite the non-friendly periods, Turkey and the U.S. shared common 
interests at the core. Since both countries suffer in times of deterioration, they always 
focus on improving relations. However, it is impossible to align all the interests of a 
regional power with a global power. Yet, these areas of potential friction can be 
overcome by mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect. Overall, instead of fighting 
over the smaller issues, both sides should focus on the big picture, without harming the 
sensitivities of the other.  
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II. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM THE END OF 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNTIL 1964 CYPRUS CRISIS 
Since the end of WWII, Turkey and the U.S. have been cooperating on key 
security issues. Although this cooperation is defined as a strategic partnership, it was, in 
author’s opinion not a true strategic partnership in the period between 1945 and 1963. 
Turkish-American relations during this time should have been defined as a “patron-client 
relationship”4 instead granted the nature of the bi-lateral relations in the cold war. 
The alliance was established in the era 1949-1952 for several reasons. The first 
reason for a Turkish-American alliance was security.  Turkish-American interests 
converged on the concept that Turkey was under severe threat of Soviet aggression and 
the U.S. was worried about the expansion of Soviet influence in the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Secondly, “Turkey’s need for military and economic 
assistance,” which was supplied by Washington in the 1950s, appeared as another reason 
for the alliance. Turkey was suffering economically and militarily after the Independence 
War. Thus, to contain the Soviets, Turkey needed aid and the U.S. supplied the aid for 
that reason. The third point is the strategic reasons. From the Turkish point of view, 
nobody else could halt the Soviets but the U.S. From Washington’s point of view, Turkey 
was located in a strategic place “that constituted a natural barrier between two regions.” 
Therefore, Turkey should be kept “in the Western camp.” The fourth reason is the 
ideological dimension of the alliance. For Turkey there were no options but 
Westernization, since Ataturk had pointed this way for success. Hence, Turkey followed 
Western policies to satisfy its ally, the U.S., as Washington was in favor of Turkey’s 
national policies. Eventually, this policy caused some acrimony in the relations during 




                                                 
4 Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive 
Alliance, 13. 
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significant actor in terms of forming alliances. This was a valid reason for Ankara as it 
saw Washington as “the insurance of Turkey’s democratic political and democratic 
process.”5 
In Ataturk’s time,  in the 1920s through the Second World War, Turkey preferred 
the neutrality option since it was afraid of the devastating effect of another war into 
which Turkey might have been drawn because of an alliance. Thus, Turkey focused on 
domestic affairs and maintained its friendly relations with all the countries in the world 
without forming alliances. When Ankara realized that neutrality became a choice after 
World War II, as the Soviets emerged as a significant threat, the U.S. was seen as the 
mandatory direction for Ankara due to its capacity to contain the Soviets. In this context, 
Turkey and the U.S., taking into consideration all the reasons above, decided to intensify 
their relations. The alliance grew out of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, in 
terms of security concerns, and Turkey’s need for assistance. It was solidified with 
Turkey becoming a member of NATO in 1952. Thus, in the beginning of the 1950s, 
Washington supplied everything to Ankara that it needed, and in return, Ankara followed 
orders from Washington, as the Soviets were still a threat. Because of the remoteness of 
the U.S., Turkey welcomed U.S. military facilities in its territory in the 1950s in case a 
quick response to a Soviet attack became necessary. Moreover, especially during the 
Menderes government of the 1950s, Washington was seen as the insurance of the 
democratic process in Turkey.  
However, the close cooperation lost some impetus toward the end of the 1950s. 
Some reasons for establishing alliances have been mentioned above. In contrast, there are 
some reasons that eroded the alliance. The costs-benefit issue occupied an important 
place in the agenda of Turkish-American relations. Through the end of the 1950s, leftists 
in Turkey increased their voices against the costs of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in a manner 
typical of other continental European countries. Their main concerns were focused on 
becoming the target of another country (either an enemy or a neighbor) and losing some 
“independence, status, prestige, and influence” due to the alliance. The Lebanon case and 
                                                 
5 Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive 
Alliance, 13-18. 
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the status of American soldiers and facilities in Turkey were taken into consideration in 
this concept. Moreover, the U.S. was gaining more than Turkey, a fact that was strongly 
criticized by leftists in the media. Another factor was the “cohesion of alliance.” After the 
Soviet threat decreased in the early 1960s, both countries began to act more unilaterally. 
This was the case when the U.S. removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey without any 
consultation in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Since Turkey was a sensitive 
country in terms of its identity, nationality and capacity, the removal of the missiles, 
without any consultation, rankled Ankara as giving substance to the critics of NATO as 
to the willfulness of the Americans at the expense of those they claimed to defend. The 
important point is that in spite of this, Turkish-American relations were maintained at a 
high level as both sides needed the support of the other. All sides recognized that 
fluctuations in the alliance were temporary. However, a convergence of ideas on key 
issues yielded a strong alliance in this period. 
A. ATATURK PERIOD (1923-1938) 
The first official relations between Turkey and the United States (U.S.) were 
economic rather than diplomatic.  Sources regarding relations between these two 
countries are very restricted, especially during the period between World War I (WWI) 
and World War II (WWII).  This is due to several reasons, some of which include: (a) the 
implementation of the Monroe Doctrine by the U.S., which resulted in America being 
isolated from the rest of the world;6 (b) the inability to access official Turkish archives 
during those years; (c) the formulation of the Turkish Foreign Policy “in those years 
[only by] President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, and the Foreign  
Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras…on a limited scale, and usually in general terms;”7 and (d) 
the Economic Crisis of 1929 resulting in an “American…isolation strategy during that 
period.”8  
                                                 
6 Fahir Armaoglu, “Ataturk Doneminde Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri,” Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi 
38 (1997): 1. 
7 Aryeh Scmuelevitz, “Ataturk’s Policy Towards Great Powers: Principles and Guidelines,” Society’s 
Quarterly Voice of Ataturk, 1. 
8 Omer Goksel Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and 
Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Turkish Journal of International Relations, 4, no. 3, (Fall 2005): 21.  
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In 1912, Woodrow Wilson was elected president of the U.S.  While he thought 
the Ottoman Empire would collapse in the very near future, he did not assign an 
ambassador to Istanbul.  Prior to the U.S. declaring war on Germany in April of 1917, the 
Ottoman Empire ceased diplomatic relations with the U.S.  When the U.S. declared war 
on Germany, Germany strongly encouraged the Ottoman Empire to declare war on the 
U.S.  During this time, the U.S. followed a neutrality policy toward the Ottoman Empire, 
but kept their concerns, which were focused on American schools (426), missionary 
centers (17), and American hospitals (9)9 within Turkey’s borders.  To alleviate these 
concerns, the Ottoman Empire declared that all the rights of these American institutions 
were guaranteed, despite the recent recession, and that relations would be the same as 
before.10    
In fact, American relations with the new Turkish Republic became more concrete 
after the declaration of Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918 because point twelve was 
directly related to the Turkish Republic.  Point twelve states: “The Turkish portions of the 
present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other 
nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security 
of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the 
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce 
of all nations under international guarantees.”11 This principle brought hope for the 
Ottoman Empire prior to signing the Armistice of Moudros; however, Ataturk initiated a 
National Struggle. After being encouraged by Wilson’s twelfth point, Ataturk searched 
for ways to improve relations with the U.S. His first unofficial attempt to introduce the 
Turkish National Struggle to the U.S. was made toward General James Harbord, who was 
assigned by the Paris Conference to conduct a “fact-finding mission”12 regarding the 
                                                 
9 Doc. Dr. Necmettin Tozlu, “Kultur ve Egitim Tarihimizde Yabanci Okullar,” Ankara: Akcag, 1991, 
78. 
10 Fahir Armaoglu, “ Turkiye’deki Amerikan Okullari Krizi 1927-1928,” Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi 
Dergisi 37 (March 1997): Cilt XIII, 1.  
11 Woodrow Wilson, Wilson’s speech in the U.S. Congress on January 8, 1918. 
12 Kara Serdar, Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11 (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2007), 8. 
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Armenians in Sivas.13 In discussions between Ataturk and General Harbord, Ataturk 
succeeded in relaying the aims of the Turkish National Struggle and won the general’s 
sympathy.14   
The first official attempt by the Ankara government to introduce the Turkish 
National Struggle to the U.S. was during the Independence War in January 1921, but was 
refused by Washington.15 Ataturk got his first victory when America sent Diplomat 
Robert W. Imbrie to visit the Ankara Government in June 1922. Imbrie’s visit had many 
positive effects on the American Minister of Foreign Affairs and the American press in 
terms of friendly feelings between the two countries.16 Later that same year, “a prominent 
American journalist named Isaac Frederick Marcosson came to Ankara…where he had 
an opportunity to interview Mustafa Kemal.”17 This interview was very important and 
reflected Ataturk’s view on the U.S.  Ataturk said,  
The American ideal is our ideal. As you had a Declaration of 
Independence, we also have our National Pact. Both of these documents 
are of the same nature; like you, we also wanted independence. Turkey 
and America are democratic societies. Turkey and the United States can 
cooperate in the commercial and economic fields. We welcome the entry 
of American capital into Turkey. I carefully examined the lives of George 
Washington and Abraham Lincoln. The United States of America was 
founded upon thirteen governments; there is a similarity between the 
present day Turkey and these thirteen governments. You Americans 
liberated yourselves from the yoke of the English; we also won our 
independence from them. The world should witness the birth of a new 
nation in Turkey. Do you know why I liked Washington and Lincoln? 
Both worked for the advancement, elevation, and prosperity of America. 
However, your other presidents strove to gain honor and fame. This high 
service is the service which a person assumes without thinking of himself. 
You perhaps find such a statement of a man like me who is both a soldier 
                                                 
13 Hulki Cevizoglu, Isgal ve Direnis 1919 ve Bugun (Ankara: Ceviz Kabugu Yayinlari, 2007), 299-
300. 
14 Fahir Armaoglu, “Ataturk Doneminde Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri,” Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi 
Dergisi 38 (1997): 1, 4. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 5. 
17 Ayse Cebesoy Sarialp, “Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasa (Ataturk) and an American Journalist,” Society’s 
Quarterly Voice of Ataturk, 1. 
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and a Turk a bit strange; but in these ideas laid the foundation of the entire 
nation. The Turks were in a position of minority in the Ottoman Empire 
for centuries, but now the Ottoman Empire has ceased to exist. Now, we 
Turks alone control our own homeland, we are the masters of our own 
house.18 
It is clear that Ataturk tried to gain the support of the U.S. during the National 
Struggle years in order to establish a balance of power with the Western powers, such as 
Britain, France and Italy, who were enemies of the Turkish State at that time. It is hard to 
say that he was successful in his plans since America always rejected Turkish proposals 
and acted in compliance with the Western powers. The main reason for this American 
behavior was the American interest in Turkish territory, which was clearly declared at the 
Lausanne Conference after the end of the war: equality of opportunity over Turkish 
territory; permanence of American schools and other institutions; and a new Armenian 
State in the Eastern part of Turkey. Because of these ongoing problems, the U.S. Senate 
did not approve the General Agreement between Turkey and America after the Lausanne 
Conference. 
Relations returned to a normal level after a Modus Vivendi19 and the reciprocal 
assignment of ambassadors in 1927.20 This stability, however, was hampered by an 
incident at Bursa American Girls College in 1928, which resulted in the closure of the 
school.21 Three Turkish students decided to become Christians through the influence of 
some American teachers; this event was seen as sabotage to secularism by the Turkish 
government. Despite the objections of American ambassador Grew, these teachers were 
judged in Turkish courts and deported to the U.S.22 In addition, renewal of the Neutrality 
                                                 
18 Ayse Cebesoy Sarialp, “Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasa (Ataturk) and an American Journalist,” Society’s 
Quarterly Voice of Ataturk, 1. 
19 Rifat Ucarol, Siyasi Tarih (Istanbul: Filiz Kitapevi, 2000), 576. 
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and Friendship Commitment between Turkey and the Soviet Union forced the U.S. to be 
more cautious of their relationship with Turkey.  
Tensions were reduced and relations were once again put back on track thanks to 
the close personal friendship between Ataturk and Roosevelt that had existed since 1932. 
They kept in touch with each other through condolence, celebration, or personal letters 
until the death of Ataturk.  The New York Times published two letters with permission 
from Roosevelt on July 10, 1937, captioning them “Roosevelt Lauds Ataturk’s 
Regime…”23 
Turkey and America had improved friendly relations with little exception during 
Ataturk’s time, but were far from having a strategic partnership. First, Ataturk focused on 
internal affairs and was against the participation of military organizations. “Turkey has 
avoided a large scale war for over 80 years. Aptulahat Aksin, the first Turkish 
ambassador to Syria, stated that Ataturk generally disliked military alliances and pacts 
believing that they caused insecurities in neighbor nations, which would be contrary to 
Turkey’s interests. In Ataturk's time, Turkey’s position was non-alignment due to its need 
to accomplish internal reforms and create a strong, modern state.”24At this time, both 
countries were pursuing isolation policies due to internal problems in their own countries. 
Turkey did not give up her neutrality promise despite pressure from the Western 
Allies during WWII. She “maintained strict neutrality during critical stages of the war, 
mainly in accordance with the principle that a nation should fight only in case of real 
danger to its national independence and territorial integrity — more so since, in this case, 
any involvement in war could truly be a danger in both these respects. However, 
following World War II, Turkish leaders evidently felt there was no other choice but to 
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Turkey’s security, and to look for an ally in the West — this time the United States, 
together with the Western European powers.”25 The first settlement of a strategic 
partnership was arising. 
B. SECOND WORLD WAR AND IMMEDIATE POST WAR YEARS 
The Second World War ended as Ataturk had predicted in one of his 
conversations with American General Douglas MacArthur in 1935. According to Ataturk, 
The Versailles peace settlement will not end the reasons that started the 
World War…If authorities in Europe do not get together on the basis of 
controversies of political contacts and try to placate their own hatreds and 
interests, it will be tragic…The victorious power after the war between 
1940 and 1945 will not be England, France, or Germany, but 
Bolshevism…Bolshevism is getting to be a great threat to Europe and 
Asia.26  
After the devastating effects of WWII, only two countries emerged as 
superpowers: the U.S. and the USSR. “Despite surviving the Second World War virtually 
unscathed, Turkey however, was soon to see that the situation after the war was 
demanding careful diplomacy as much as it had done previously. Throughout the war, 
Inonu [Turkish President] came to the conclusion that Turkey’s biggest problem after the 
war would be the prospect of facing all alone the more powerful Soviet Union.”27 
Although Turkey had followed a neutrality policy before WWII, it was difficult to 
maintain this policy in the new system of bipolar structure.28 As a result, Turkey shifted 
its policy toward an alignment with the West to escape  the Soviet threat. 
The aggressive demands of the Soviet Union were constant during WWII, but 
increased toward the end. As a precaution, Turkey mobilized its troops to the Edirne-
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Catalca and Kars-Ardahan lines. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Soviets 
demonstrated their desire to have bases on the Straits and to gain territories in the eastern 
part of Turkey, which became an official demand after June 7, 1945. Meanwhile, on 19 
March 1945, the Soviets denounced “the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-
Aggression.”29 
Although Turkey rejected all Soviet demands, the Soviets continued to put 
pressure on Turkey on an increasing scale. Thus, Turkey “unsuccessfully tried to involve 
the United States in defending Turkey against the Soviet Union and bring the United 
States’ position on the Straits into harmony with the minimum Turkish view.”30 The 
keystone was July 1946, when the Soviets demanded “the sole control of the Straits by 
the Black Sea Powers.”31 Turkey rejected this proposal, but this time with the full support 
of the U.S., Britain, and France. Moreover, “the United States announced its intention to 
maintain a permanent naval presence in Mediterranean.”32 Turkish-American relations 
were beginning to be woven in a strategic dimension for the first time in history.  
Consequently, Turkey began to occupy an important place in the U.S. foreign 
affairs with Greece. Turkey was seen as the key country for the U.S. to encircle and stop 
the Soviet Union expansion. Turkey’s geographical position was a natural obstacle for 
the Soviet Union’s expansion toward the Middle East and the Mediterranean.33 But 
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and showed admirable determination to resist…Turkey’s army, though sizable, was 
poorly equipped and would have been no match for the battle-tested divisions of the 
Kremlin.”34 
In April 1946, the U.S. demonstrated its desire to improve relations by sending 
the U.S.S. Missouri to Istanbul, which was deeply appreciated and celebrated by the 
Turkish public and press. Even though “the ship was merely bearing the remains of the 
late Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Munir Ertegun, who had died in 
Washington in 1944, the signal being sent to the USSR and the Turkish public was 
clear.”35  
C. TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
At the end of 1946, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey reported from Ankara that 
“Turkey will not be able to maintain indefinitely a defensive posture against the Soviet 
Union. The burden is too great for the nation’s economy to carry much longer.”36 Just 
two months after this report, on February 21, 1947, the British Government declared its 
withdrawal from the region because of its own domestic problems. The withdrawal of 
British troops from Greece would endanger the security of Turkey and the Middle East in 
the case of a Soviet expansion. “Turkey, the only country in the area with an army strong 
enough to make the Russians hesitate, would find itself in an untenable position. 
Therefore the United States, by filling the gap caused by the British withdrawal, [had to] 
show a greater determination to resist this Communist drive…”37 
After much deliberation between President Truman and his advisers, they 
concluded that the protection of stability in Greece and Turkey was vital to U.S. security 
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interests. “According to the predictions, if the Soviet Union controlled Turkey, the 
Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean could also succumb to Soviet rule, and 
Communist ideology would harm the vital interests of the United States in that region.”38 
Thus, the U.S. decided to revise its foreign policy and began to support Turkey and 
Greece economically; this is known as the Truman Doctrine. 
After WWII, Turkey was forced to find an ally.  The U.S. was seen as “the leader 
and protector of the Western Democracies and it was the only country capable of lending 
money which Turkey’s economy badly needed at that time.”39 In addition, the U.S. and 
Turkey were located very far from each other geographically, which made an important 
argument for the Turkish Government to gain the U.S. as a new ally.40  The most 
important factor, however, to move toward the Western camp, was the result of the 
historical Soviet threat “as Khrushchev put it: the Soviet demands succeeded in 
frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans.”41 
In his famous speech on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman defined the 
vital reasons for the aid to Greece and Turkey as follows:  
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will 
be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East…Turkey has sought 
additional financial assistance…for the maintenance of its national 
integrity. That integrity is essential for the preservation of order in the 
Middle East…If we falter in our leadership we may endanger the peace of 
the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.42  
After his speech, the President asked Congress for $400 million in aid until the 
end of June 1948; Turkey was to receive a quarter ($100 million) of this aid. After  
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President Truman signed the bill on May 22, 1947, the aid was officially authorized. In 
his memoirs, President Truman underlines this aid as his most important decision after 
bombing Hiroshima.43 
According to the Truman Doctrine, Turkey would be supplied not only financially 
but also with service and intelligence. America authorized military and civilian personnel 
to check whether the aid was directed properly in compliance with American Public Law 
75. This law also provided for the training and education of Turkish and Greek personnel 
in the U.S.44 
Despite the many benefits of the Truman aid, Turkey was concerned by some 
parts of the law regarding the historic experiments in capitulation. Turkey’s “objection to 
use the word “administrator” was solved by naming the ambassador chief of the mission, 
with the heads of the army, air force, navy and roads groups having the title of 
director.”45 Additional concerns were eliminated after successful negotiations. Finally, 
Turkey and the U.S. signed the aid program on July 12, 1947; the fourth point, however, 
would pose a problem when Turkey initiated an operation on Cyprus in 1964. 
The Truman Doctrine was significant in various ways. First of all, U.S. national 
interests were to support “Turkey and Greece against the common enemy, the Soviets, or 
Communism as another way to put it.”46 Secondly, the aid was given to two countries 
who had previously defined each other as enemy. (These countries later disagreed on 
Cyprus in the 1950s and 1960s.)  Consequently, the Truman Doctrine was the key for 
reciprocal relations between Turkey and the U.S.; by receiving aid, Turkey was “no 
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longer isolated.”47 By forming an alliance with mutual need, Turkey became more 
comfortable and self-confident in the region. Lastly, it was the first signal of the Cold 
War, as well as “the containment policy of the U.S. against the Soviets.”48 
D. MARSHALL PLAN 
After WWII, the economies of many European countries were totally destroyed. 
They had consumed all of their economic resources during the war and were struggling to 
find new resources. Thus, the Soviet Union wanted to enhance its pressure on these 
countries. As a result, the U.S. State Department initiated a new program for Europe to 
develop its devastated economy. “The remarks of secretary Marshall at Harvard on June 
5, 1947, describing this urgency led to the much vaster economic aid program known as 
the Marshall Plan.”49 
“Proclamation of the Marshall plan in June 1947 faced the Ankara authorities 
with the urgent problem of discovering how they might fit into this project.”50 The U.S. 
was not interested in including Turkey in the Marshall Plan because the U.S. felt that 
Turkey’s vital needs were already being met by the Truman Doctrine. In addition, 
according to U.S. officials, Turkey had the capacity to support Europe with agricultural 
products.51 
At that time, Turkey had recently transformed into a multi-party system from a 
one-party system and sought political stabilization. Thus, Turkey sent a group of 
delegates to the U.S. in order to convince U.S. officials that Turkey would benefit from 
the Marshall Plan. After long negotiations, the U.S. gave ground and “agreed to extend 
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Turkey $10 million in credits.”52 However, in order to maintain eligibility, the Turkish 
government had to follow up with new policies including a free market and reduced 
barriers for trade. Although some left-wing parties strongly criticized these new policies  
by accusing America of trying to seek “control of Turkey’s resources in order to be able 
to exploit the country as a colony, …Turks greeted the Marshall Plan with warm 
appreciation.”53  
From 1947 to 1961, which included both the Truman and Marshall aid, “Turkey 
received $1,862 million in military assistance and $1,394 million in economic assistance 
from the United States.”54 Most of this was spent on mechanization of agriculture, 
modernization of mining processes, constructing highways, and other sectors. 
Specifically, the Marshall Plan focused on the agriculture sector much more than on the 
other sectors. Therefore, the Turkish Government’s Democratic Party was criticized for 
the policies that caused “alienation”55 between elites and peasants “which would set the 
stage for a military revolt”56 in 1960.  
E. NATO MEMBERSHIP 
Until 1948, the U.S. rejected the establishment of military alliances, even though 
it was offered many times by the Turkish Government. When the Communist party 
became the ruling government in Czechoslovakia, and Berlin was blockaded by the 
Soviet Union in 1948, the U.S. decided to shift its policy. With the members of the 
Brussels Pact (England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg), the U.S. formed 
the Western defense system called NATO “with no provision for Turkish membership” in 
April 1949.57 
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Turkey was disappointed at not being included and began to feel further isolated. 
In order to convince the U.S. to include Turkey in NATO, many Turkish bureaucrats and 
government officials arranged meetings with Washington officials. None of these 
negotiations was successful because the U.S. was reluctant “to undertake further 
responsibilities until NATO’s structure had been firmly established.” Moreover, it was 
not only the U.S. who opposed Turkish entry, but also Western European countries. Their 
main point was that the enlargement of NATO to a non-industrialized and Muslim 
Turkey would harm the strength of European unity. In addition, they were afraid of a 
reduction in the aid they were receiving from the U.S.58  
On the other hand, the British government focused on retaining its hold on the 
Middle East as a central part of strategic policy. They wanted Turkey to join a Middle 
East defense system that was supervised by the British government. However, “the global 
situation changed radically” after the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in June 
1950.59 
At that time, the Democratic Party was elected after the successful transformation 
from a single-party system to a multi-party system in Turkey. The election, which was 
seen as a democratic reform in Turkey, was welcomed and appreciated by Washington. 
“On July 25, 1950, the Menderes Government announced its decision to send a 4500-man 
unit to join the U.S. troops in Korea…without consulting the opposition parties or 
gaining parliamentary approval.” This decision was the key to NATO membership. After 
fighting bravely within the allied lines, Turkey won the full support and sympathy of her 
Western allies. Accordingly, on August 1, 1950, the “Turkish Foreign office approached 
the U.S., British, and French ambassadors with a request” for full membership to 
NATO.60 
Although initially supportive of Turkey’s membership in NATO, the U.S. policy 
shifted due to the strategic views of General Eisenhower, who was the Supreme Allied 
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Commander in Europe at that time. According to Eisenhower, Europe was shaped like a 
“bottleneck.” The Soviets were in the wide part, central Europe in the neck, and Spain 
represented the end. If the Soviets had attempted to attack the “central bottleneck,” 
Europe would have responded by using its flanks. With this in mind, Turkey was in a 
vital geographic position, being located to the south of the Soviet Union.61 Also, the 
extension of the borders of NATO to include Turkey, “would force the Soviets to commit 
considerable forces away from the European Theater. In other words, there was a 
mutuality of benefits in the Turkish-American relationship.”62 As a result, Turkey was 
accepted as a full member of NATO in February 1952. 
NATO membership had multiple effects on Turkey. Although the new foreign 
policy of the Turkish Republic after WWII seemed to lead Turkey into NATO, this was 
not the only reason. Turkish concerns regarding her economic conditions “played a 
considerable part [with] the idea that its exclusion might lead to a decrease of U.S. 
interest and subsequent reduction in American aid must have had its weight in the 
government’s decision.”63 Also, the Democratic Party escaped a domestic “diplomatic 
defeat” because of its Western-based policies. In addition, NATO membership relieved 
Turkish concerns of American aid in the case of a Soviet attack. Moreover, it was 
perceived as a victory of Turkish Foreign Affairs in terms of being treated as a European 
Country.64 Pro-Americanism among the Turkish public increased so much that Turks 
began to feel themselves and Americans “intrinsically alike” and Turkey as “Little 
America.”65 
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On the American side, the U.S. assumed that mutual interests between the two 
countries were completely harmonious. Therefore, an overestimation of “U.S. freedom of 
activity in Turkey” emerged. When the U.S. planners began to take advantage of the 
alliance over issues that were not related to “containing the Soviet Union,” a definition of 
the scope of cooperation was required.66 
Between 1950 and 1960, Turkey improved her relations with the U.S. in terms of 
military cooperation. Until 1957, an important number of “U.S.-cum-NATO facilities 
were constructed in Turkey, including, most notably, an air base at Incirlik, near Adana, 
with other bases at Karamursel, Cigli, and Diyarbakir, and radar stations at Karamursel, 
Sinop, Samsun, Trabzon, Belbasi, and Diyarbakir, and [some naval facilities] at 
Iskenderun.”67 In 1955, Turkey was involved in another project, the Baghdad Pact, which 
was initiated by the British and U.S. governments. The U.S. was not an actual member of 
the Baghdad Pact, but was a strong supporter and financier. Turkey, with Iran, was an 
essential actor in this pact, especially for the U.S., because of the Turkish border with the 
Soviet Union. According to Hale, although Turkey did not have a definite policy towards 
the Middle East, to keep from being excluded from “economic and military aid,” Turkey 
preferred to participate.68 As a result, in 1957 Turkey received over $200 million in 
military aid via the Eisenhower doctrine, which promised aid to Middle Eastern countries 
that contained Communism.69 “Turkey, as the first Muslim country has also recognized 
Israel and proved to be a very significant and viable partner for the American Middle 
East policy determined by the Eisenhower Doctrine.”70 
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F. TENSIONS 
In 1958, the first slight divergence in mutual relations emerged. Lebanon was 
about to be involved in a domestic fight because of escalated tension between the Muslim 
and Christian populations in July 1958. Therefore, the Lebanese government called for 
urgent support from the U.S.  Due to the urgency of the situation, the U.S. provided rapid 
support from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. Although the Democratic Party demonstrated 
no objection to this, it resulted in a negative perception by the Turkish public. Instead of 
consulting Turkish authorities about the Lebanon operation, the U.S. only notified them. 
Thus, “Inonu and his associates attacked the U.S. operation as an abuse of Turkish 
sovereignty…” In addition, the scope of collaboration emerged as a question in their 
minds. Was it collaboration only when dealing with the containment of the Soviets or 
should it be perceived in a broader perspective related to the “coincidence of mutual 
interests” even if it harms Turkish interests in some way?71  The main perception on the 
Turkish side was that there was a prioritization of U.S. interests “over those of its ally, 
Turkey.”72 
When an American U-2 spy plane was shot down in 1960 by the USSR while 
flying over the Soviet Union, Turkey became more suspicious about its alliance with the 
U.S. The Soviet Union accused Turkey of granting permission for the “plane to use 
Turkish bases.”73 Turkey denied the Soviet’s accusation and proved that the plane, which 
flew a route from Pakistan to Norway, had nothing to do with Turkish bases. As a result, 
Turkey wanted the U.S. to inform her regarding all these flights and “cancelled all U-2 
flights from her” territory.74 
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In terms of military cooperation, and in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine 
of massive retaliation and the burden of nuclear sharing, Turkey allowed fifteen mid-
range Jupiter ballistic missiles, equipped with nuclear warheads, to be placed inside 
Turkish national territory in October 1959. “The missiles were installed at a base near 
Izmir in autumn of 1961,” and became ready for operation in 1962. Due to the 
installation of the missiles in Turkey, Turkish politicians and elites were divided into two 
groups. The first group was not in favor of installing the missiles as “they might provoke 
an attack by the Soviet Union.” According to the second group, the missiles demonstrated 
the power of Turkey and the determination of the alliance to respond to the Soviet Union  
in case of an attack on Turkey. These Jupiter missiles were given to Turkey in terms of 
military aid with the exception of the nuclear warheads, which were controlled by the 
U.S.75 
From 1959 until the missiles were installed in Turkey, the, American government  
questioned the benefits of the liquid fueled missiles, which “would soon be outdated by 
the Polaris submarine-launched system.” Moreover, they were assessed as “vulnerable to 
a Soviet first strike.” Therefore, the Kennedy administration, with its policy of flexible 
response, decided to revise the installation of the missiles in Turkish territory, but the 
result did not change due to strong opposition from the Turkish government. From the 
Turkish point of view, the missiles were related to Turkey’s the “National Security.”76 . 
On the other hand, according to U.S. authorities, the missiles had no substantial 
importance in terms of deterrence against the Soviet Union. Although the U.S. did deploy 
the missiles into Turkey, the main point was not Turkish opposition. The main reason 
was not to be seen as weak “after Khrushchev’s diplomatic defense at the Vienna 
Summit” in 1961. Deployment of the missiles demonstrated another divergence of 
interests between two countries.77 
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On October 26, 1962, President Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev 
offering a trade, which was to withdraw the missiles in Cuba in return “for an American 
agreement to lift the Quarantine and a pledge not to invade the island.”78  The next 
morning, a second letter from Khrushchev arrived. This time his offer was revised and 
the withdrawal of the missiles in Cuba was attached to the withdrawal of the Jupiter 
missiles in Turkey. In order not to “provoke further demands from Khrushchev” and 
disappoint Turkish interests “to appease an enemy,” President Kennedy simply ignored 
the second letter and responded to the first one “accepting the withdrawal of the Soviet 
missiles without a trade.” The crisis was over.79 Although it seems that the Jupiter 
missiles in Turkey were excluded as part of the trade by the U.S., that was not the case. 
According to the memoirs of Senator Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy’s brother, the 
U.S. pledged to withdraw the Jupiter missiles, after a short while, in return for the 
withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. As a result, the Jupiter missiles were removed 
in 1963.80  
The Cuban Missile Crisis left deep marks on Turkish foreign policy makers. First 
of all, it was clear that the U.S. might act independently without consulting its allies when 
its interests were at stake. Secondly, Turkey, “in its dealings with both the United States 
and the Soviet Union, needed to be more cautious than it had been in 1959–62”81 because 
“a decision by Washington might jeopardize her safety even her existence.”82 
Consequently, Turkey decided to revise her Washington-dependent foreign policy in 
favor of a multilateral foreign policy. Turkey initiated improving relations with the Soviet 
Union, which had been neglected since 1932.83 
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G. A REVIEW 
In summary, from the end of the WWII to the end of 1963, Turkey and the U.S. 
improved relations on the basis of a common enemy, the Soviet Union. They both 
benefited from this alliance, but in fact, their foreign policies were not totally convergent 
because of their different geographical positions and global perspectives.84 Due to strong  
Soviet pressures, Turkey, thinking emotionally rather than rationally on a long-term 
basis, attached her interests to the U.S. with “blind loyalty.”85 However, in the end, 
Turkey realized that her national interests “and the U.S.’ would not always be 
identical.”86 
Turkish-American relations during the Ataturk period were not developed with a 
strategic concept. The main reason might be Turkey’s urgent domestic issues after the 
War of Independence. At that time, Turkey had to focus on domestic rather than 
international issues. In addition, the U.S. was unwilling to form strong relations with 
Turkey. Since Turkey’s southern borders were still problematic, especially Mosul and 
Syria, the U.S. refrained from initiating diplomatic relations with Turkey.  The U.S. 
demanded that Turkey resolve its border problems with Britain and France first. British 
officials offered an appealing share of Mosul oil to the U.S., thus, the U.S. government at 
that time did not back Turkey. Yet Turkey was pursuing a trustworthy ally as it realized 
that it was alone in the international arena.  
Turkey’s desires, in terms of finding an ally, were fulfilled when the Soviets 
emerged as a threat after WWII. Until the 1960s, Turkish-American relations were 
shaped around the same threat, “Communism.” In this context, Turkey’s gains were the 
Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO membership. Turkey not only enhanced 
the capacity of its army, but also improved its roads and infrastructure by means of the 
military aid provided by the U.S. Thus, besides the Communism factor as the initiator of 
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relations, Turkey avoided differentiating its interests from the U.S. in order to keep an 
economic source. In addition, this economic contribution by the U.S. consolidated the 
position of the government in Turkey. From the American side, Turkey was a trusted ally 
with a minimum cost to contain the Soviet Union. By securing all of the Middle East via 
Turkey, the U.S. was hitting many birds with just one stone. 
Despite collaboration between Turkey and the U.S., there were definite points of 
conflicts as well. To begin with, the U.S. was a global power, but Turkey was a regional 
one. Therefore, American and Turkish views and interpretations of events differed 
strongly in some periods and cases. Lebanon, U-2 and the Cuban Crisis were the clearest 
examples of this kind. Although both countries shared the same threat, “Communism,” 
the priorities of both sides might vary according to other factors. When Turkey felt itself 
strongly threatened by Communism, secondary concerns were not considered, but when 
the threat faded a bit, Turkish priorities changed. Related to this, Turkey and U.S. goals 
were not aligned. Turkey’s main motivation was to improve its economic and diplomatic 
conditions by means of good relations with the U.S. However, the U.S., as a global 
power, was in favor of securing the region, and sometimes urged it to act unilaterally at 
the expense of its other ally, Turkey. Turkish citizens were sensitive to their national 
sovereignty. All three cases mentioned above, were interpreted as an abuse of national 
sovereignty, which in return provoked the Turkish public to turn against the U.S. 
According to the Turkish people, America might act unilaterally in some cases at the 
expense of others when its own interests were at stake.  In my opinion, at this point, the 
emotional structure of Turkish citizens might have played an important role, acting as a 
hindrance in the relations. Yet, these events were exaggerated by the opposition press to 
instigate the public, whose aim was to make the government appear to be a satellite of the 
U.S. This opposition group consisted of the far-leftists, who judged the U.S. to be  an 
imperialistic power, but in fact were only a small part of the Turkish elite. Thus, domestic 
pressure sometimes restricted the Turkish government from cooperating further with the 
U.S. Overall, Turkish-American relations started with the “Communism” threat, stiffened 
by the efforts of the Turkish government’s efforts to correspond its interests with the 
U.S.’, but decreased due to different global, geographical and domestic concerns.  
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Turkey and the U.S.’ main collaborations were based on “the context of a western 
defense system.”87 Turkey, as the southern flank of NATO, was a trusted ally for 
containment of Soviet expansion to the Middle East. For Turkey, there was no choice but 
to protect herself “from the Soviet Aggression,” Thus, the “Turkish-American 
friendship…began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in the 1950s…”88  Despite a 
few cases from 1945 to 1963, the tension between the U.S. and Turkey had escalated, but 
relations were maintained at a high-level without any significant conflict. In this light, it 
can be interpreted that the relations were pre-destined to improve despite some 
deteriorations, due to the essential common interests. The main turning point in the 
mutual relations emerged with the Cyprus Crisis in 1964, due to contrasting approaches. 
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III. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING COLD WAR 
(1964-1980) 
Turkish-American relations became more of a patron-client relationship in the 
period between 1945 and 1964. However, after President Johnson’s letter of 1964, the 
relationship changed into more of a “small state—big state relationship,”89 in terms of 
Turkish attempts to act unilaterally regarding the asymmetry of these diplomatic 
relations. This period witnessed asymmetric interests related to the conflict of global 
power versus regional power. When Turkish officials noticed that it was impossible to 
converge all national and security interests as a small state with the U.S. as a super 
power, they called for some unilateral acts. Yet these acts were still dependent, to some 
degree, on the U.S., if not at the beginning in the 1950s, then at least at the end in the 
1970s. As a result of these conflicts over the divergent strategic interests, the relationship 
had ups and downs, especially downs during this period.  However, through the end of 
the 1970s, as the author argues, relations were on the way to improving, as both countries 
shared the same core strategic interests. At the end of the 1970s, common strategic 
interest again appeared as the protection against “Communism.” Thus, as usual, the 
zigzagging relations were put back on track.  
The essential problems of this period were: 1) Cyprus and 2) opium. To begin 
with, it is useful to take a deeper look into the fate of the island Cyprus in the mid 
twentieth century.  
A. CYPRUS90 
Cyprus is a Mediterranean island located 65 km. south of Turkey and 800 km. 
from Greece. Since the island is in a very critical geographic position in the southern part 
                                                 
89 Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive 
Alliance, 216. 
90 The author grants the island the name Cyprus in this thesis. In order to prevent confusion in 
academic literature, the word “Cyprus” is used to describe the island. However, Cyprus is composed of two 
independent nations:  the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the Greek Republic of South Cyprus. 
Hence, since 1986, Cyprus refers to both countries. 
 32
of Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, Turkish officials were always concerned about 
the situation on the island for national security reasons. The main reason for the conflict 
between the two communities on the island was founded on “the Greek Cypriot struggle 
for ‘enosis’ — the union of Cyprus with Greece, and Turkish Cypriot attempts to prevent 
it.” The island had been under British rule earlier in the twentieth century.91 Turkish 
concerns on the island may be summed up by three main points: first, the danger of a 
unified Cyprus with Greece, which would restrict Turkish freedom in the Mediterranean; 
the Turkish Community on the island that needs Turkish support against the Greek 
majority; and lastly, the perception of enosis by Turks as “a first step for achieving the 
Megali Idea (re-establishment of the old Byzantine Empire).”92 On the other hand, the 
U.S., as a global power, had different concerns regarding the island. The United States 
was more focused on preventing the Soviets from seizing power in Cyprus, which could 
be used as a natural station for naval and air elements in the Mediterranean. Also, the 
island’s geographic position would enable any power to gain superiority in the 
Mediterranean.   
Cyprus became an Ottoman Empire territory in 1571. Beginning in 1878, the UK 
began an unofficial invasion and then seized control of the entire island in 1914. “A 
Greek nationalist movement going back to the 1930s, to unite the island with Greece, 
gained new momentum in the 1950s as UK and French colonial rule were crumbling in 
North Africa and the Middle East, and challenged British rule, as Britain had already 
begun to withdraw from its other colonies.”93 Due to the escalated tension on the island 
between the two communities in the late 1950s (Greek guerillas had interfered with UK 
operations at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956), negotiations among Britain, Turkey and 
Greece took place without any success until 1959. The Republic of Cyprus was founded 
in August 1960 according to the agreements in the London-Zurich Treaty of 1959.  
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Although the U.S. had no interest in Cyprus “either historically or geopolitically” 
until 1945, the “strategic interests in the southern flank of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and tensions in the Middle East”94 after the 1950s increased U.S. concerns 
on the island.  In 1958, the U.S. sent troops to Lebanon to foreclose a Syrian Baathist 
Putsch there.  Nevertheless, the U.S. was reluctant to be involved in the problem since it 
might alienate one of her two NATO allies, either Greece or Turkey. On the other hand, 
despite not being involved in the London-Zurich agreement, the U.S. wanted to keep an 
eye on the Cyprus problem, hoping for a peaceful solution between the two NATO allies.  
One of the most important results of the London-Zurich agreement was the Treaty 
of Guarantee that “allowed the three outside powers, [Britain, Turkey, and Greece], to 
consult and, if necessary, act jointly in the event of any breach of the agreements.” 
Moreover, if no consensus on a joint action could be established, any of the outside 
powers had the right to act unilaterally. Turkey founded her legacy of threat to intervene 
on the island on the basis of this agreement.95  
The difference in perception of the new status of the island was very clear among   
American and Turkish officials. Despite “American expectations that Zurich-London 
agreement did…bring the Cyprus problem to…an end,”96 after the agreement, Ismet 
Inonu, the Turkish Prime Minister, underlined the difficulty of implementing the 
constitution unless “both communities are…convinced that enosis is not possible in the 
long run.”97  
B. TOWARDS INTERVENTION 
As violence escalated between the two communities on the island, the U.S., to 
prevent the island from “exploitation by the local Communists,”98 looked for new 
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solutions. The events began in November 1963 when Makarios, the president of Cyprus, 
proposed thirteen amendments to the constitution that would pave the way for enosis and 
endanger the rights of the Turkish community on the island. Around Christmas of 1963, 
Greek attacks on the Turkish Community intensified. When tension became too high, on 
December 23, 1963, the U.S. took its first active step by warning both sides (Greece and 
Turkey) not to use the “Military Assistance Program equipment” without consulting the 
U.S.99 The next day, the U.S. wanted both the Turkish and Greek sides to calm the 
tension as the “leadership of both communities”100 was looking for ways to stop the 
violence. 
Turkish Prime Minister Inonu was not satisfied by the U.S. response to the crisis. 
According to Inonu, the only solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved by the 
involvement of the U.S. Contrary to his view, “the United States was restraining itself 
from imposing any solution on the Cyprus dispute for the fear of alienating either Greece 
or Turkey.”101 
As mentioned above, the United States’ main policy on Cyprus from 1950 to 1963 
was non-intervention. Firstly, it was perceived as a problem between the British and the 
Cypriots, which it surely was, as a British protectorate. Consequently, the U.S. did not 
want the issue to be discussed in the UN, which in return would give the Soviet Union the 
right to intervene. Secondly, the special relations between Great Britain and the United 
States “prevented the U.S. from taking a position against Britain.” Washington was being 
careful as the British had strategic concerns on the island, which was a natural base, 
similar to the colonial countries of Great Britain. The UK today still owns two bases, 
Agratur and Dikelya, which were allocated to the UK according to the London-Zurich 
Agreement. These bases are of great value to the UK since they serve Britain’s strategic  
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interests in the Mediterranean. The United States was ready to accept any solution 
regarding the island that would not harm its interests, but refused to be part of the 
discussion.102 
The United States’ perspective towards Cyprus was based on the terms of the 
Cold War, so NATO’s integrity and the containment of the Soviet Union were the 
priorities of the U.S.  The American government always supported a solution by 
negotiations among the outside powers in order to prevent a split in NATO. Since a 
conflict among the NATO members would provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union 
to exploit, the U.S. avoided bringing the issue into the United Nations. Moreover, 
“Archbishop Makarios’ [the president of Cyprus] flirtations with Moscow…could bring 
the intrusion of the Soviet Union into the Strategic Eastern Mediterranean.”103 Also, the 
United States did not intend to support one side at the expense of the other so as not to 
damage NATO’s solidarity. Americans were so focused on the Cold War perspective that 
they ignored “the bilateral aspect of the dispute among the conflicting parties.”104 The 
possibility that the island could fall under Communism was the only motivation of the 
U.S. government, to the extent that it neglected domestic conflicts on the island. To sum 
up, the U.S. concerns were: a) prevent a war between two NATO allies, b) maintain 
special relations with the UK since Cyprus was still a member of the British 
Commonwealth, c) keep the integrity of NATO, d) contain the Soviet influence on the 
island since the Communist party, AKEL (The Progressive Party of the Working People 
of Cyprus), was potentially powerful, and e) tie the island to the West.105 
From the Turkish point of view, the priority was to impede a historical enemy 
(Greece) from seizing power on the island. Secondly, the Turkish government was 
concerned about the future of the Turkish community on the island. Lastly, Turkey did 
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not intend to harm her relations with her Western Allies since Greece had threatened to 
withdraw from NATO in case there was a Turkish military intervention. Aside from all 
these concerns, since Turkey had turned its face to the West because of ‘Communism,’ it 
would be fair to say that Turkey was concerned, as much as the United States was, of a 
Communist threat on the island. However, this was not the primary Turkish goal. 
Thinking in terms of a Communist threat, Turkish and American strategic views 
were convergent in every way. “Yet, the difference in the Turkish approach was that 
Turkey did not consider Greece as a friendly country, even though it was a member of 
NATO.”106 Thus, the perspectives of both countries differentiated at a very critical point.  
The Turkish point of view was regional in contrast to the global concerns of the U.S. 
This different approach took place as a constitutional crisis in December 1963. 
The U.S. supported the amendments to avert taking the problem to the UN. Turkey, who 
regarded the amendments as the first step towards enosis, strictly opposed it.  From 
December 1963 until President Johnson’s letter in June 1964, Turkey proposed a military 
intervention on the island several times. All of these proposals were rejected by the 
American government because of the American concerns mentioned above. However, 
these proposals forced the U.S. to be involved in the Cyprus dispute with major 
implications. In fact, this was the primary intention of the Inonu government, who 
thought that only the U.S. could get the Greeks in line. 
Despite attempts to intervene militarily on the island several times, Inonu’s main 
intention was to involve the U.S. in the Cyprus dispute more actively. Since Turkey was 
suffering from inadequate military equipment and international support for such an 
operation, the U.S., as a strong ally, was the only way to benefit in such a dispute. 
Nevertheless, Turkey’s intervention bluffs set the stage for the involvement of the U.S. 
Every threat accelerated the resolution process in terms of NATO and UN peacekeeping 
missions or other diplomatic efforts. However, all these efforts were too far away to 
establish peace on the island. 
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C. PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S LETTER 
When “the presence of United Nations forces seemed insufficient to quell 
disturbances, the American Ambassador was given warning of the impending military 
operation, and this elicited the letter by President Johnson [on June 5, 1964].”107 In his 
letter, the President mentioned that  
NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an 
obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a 
step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and 
understanding of its NATO allies…I must tell you in all candor that the 
United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied 
military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present 
circumstances.108 
As a result, Turkey cancelled its intervention plans. In his response to President 
Johnson, Inonu mentioned that Greece, “who repudiates Treaties signed by herself,”109 
should be the side to be warned, instead of Turkey. Furthermore, he said that  
If NATO members should start discussing the right or wrong of the 
situation of a fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this 
aggression was provoked or not, and if the decision on whether they have 
an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue 
of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken 
and it would lose its meaning.110  
President Johnson’s letter, which “became an issue in Turkish domestic politics 
[after being] revealed in January, 1966,”111 caused a deep shock among the Turkish 
public. According to the people, Americans left Turkey alone at the expense of the 
Greeks.  Inonu interpreted the new situation as an alliance of enemies and friends against 
Turkey. In addition, the Turkish press “referred to the letter as a ‘betrayal’ of Turkey, as a 
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‘blow to national dignity,’ or as having ‘broken the Turkish nation’s heart.’”112 Johnson’s 
tone in this letter was so harsh that it affected Turkish emotions intensely. Moreover, “in 
any event, the questioning of NATO support if the Cyprus dispute should lead to a Soviet 
attack against Turkey was undoubtedly a major error.”113 In this context, a great mistrust 
towards American and NATO commitments emerged in Turkey. As a result of these 
events related to the Cyprus dispute, Turkish policy makers recognized “that their strict 
adherence to a pro-Western alignment in a period of a changing international system had 
left Turkey virtually isolated in the World Community.”114 According to the Turkish 
policy makers, it was the end of the Turkish-American honeymoon, which seemed far too 
gone to ever be revived.  
It is essential to mention here that President Johnson criticized Turkey instead of 
Greece due to certain national interests. Cyprus is an important island as whoever 
controls it has a distinct advantage in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa, in terms 
of strategy and operations. If a war between Turkey and Greece arose due to Turkish 
intervention, it would not only weaken the southern flank of NATO, but also push the 
Makarios regime towards the Soviet camp, who had already “appealed to the Soviet 
Union for support on the Cyprus question.” Therefore, instead of the non-aligned 
situation of Cyprus, a unified Cyprus with Greece, which would pull Cyprus to the 
NATO side, would be welcomed by Washington, as opposed to a Cyprus intervention 
that would bring the Soviet Union into a vulnerable southern flank.  
Inonu, in his letter to President Johnson, said that in case of a military intervention 
in Cyprus, Turkey should not be the side to be reprimanded. Since Cyprus was not a 
member of NATO, and Turkey would legitimize its military action in the context of a 
Treaty of Guarantee, if Greece declared war on Turkey then it would be the Greeks who 
would weaken NATO’s integrity. Thus, the Turkish prime minister believed that this 
                                                 
112 Vali, Bridge across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, 132. Quoted in Turkish 
newspapers Cumhuriyet, November 25, 1968, and Aksam, September 21, 1967. 
113 Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 115. 
114 Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the 
Cold War,” 119. 
 39
letter should be written to Greece instead of Turkey. But, the Turkish government was 
mistaken thinking that the U.S. would apply more restrictions to Greece instead of 
Turkey because of “the changed circumstances in…international relations… [by] 
1960s.”115 At that time, Greece was less dependent on the U.S. economically than 
Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish officials were much more willing to harmonize reciprocal 
interests with the U.S. Additionally, the Turkish view according to which “the relative 
importance of Turkey to the United States was more than that of Greece,”116 paved the 
way for diplomatic failure. 
To summarize the confrontations in the Cyprus dispute between the two 
countries: 
• The dynamics of the relations were totally separate. Since the United 
States was a global actor, it interpreted the situation through global 
concerns. Although Turkey shared her concerns regarding the Soviet 
threat, this was not a Turkish priority. Turkey, as a regional power, was 
much more involved in the regional dimension of the dispute, which was 
vis-à-vis the Greek threat. In this context, the Cold War dimension of the 
dispute was sharply divided. Moreover, Turkey had expected the U.S., as a 
leader of freedom, to find a resolution to prevent humanitarian crimes on 
the island. Yet, this was a sub-concern of the U.S. related to the Cold 
War.117 
• The two countries shared “unaligned goals.” The U.S.’ main goal was to 
maintain NATO’s integrity and “prevent this issue from being 
continuously exploited by the Soviets.” Turkey’s fear was Greek 
expansion towards her southern border.118  
• Domestic factors were also involved. The Turkish government was, at that 
time, so vulnerable that in order to pacify domestic tension, it needed to 
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killings on the island, pushed the government to make compromises. On 
the other side, the U.S. was sympathetic to Greek-American citizens 
because of its upcoming elections.119 
D. TURKEY’S REACTION TO JOHNSON’S LETTER 
After Johnson’s letter, anti-Americanism increased significantly in Turkey. 
Protests, including people shouting “Yankee Go Home” and throwing rocks towards the 
Embassy building in Ankara, blew up among the students. Consequently, “a group of 
journalists…charged the United States with attempting to intervene in Turkish domestic 
affairs to find a prime minister compliant with its wishes…CIA [was accused of] taking 
an opinion poll” about this issue.120  The United States was so worried about the 
consequences of these strong protests that it prohibited its military personnel in Turkey 
“from wearing military uniforms in the public environment.”121  
Since Turkish officials blamed the United States for betraying Turkish loyalty in 
the Cyprus dispute, Turkey decided to rearrange its foreign policy in terms of a multi-
lateral approach after the Cyprus Crisis. Its first result was “rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union… [which] was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during the 
Cyprus crisis.” The main thrusts in this policy change included a decrease of American 
aid, and rising anti-Americanism in the country.122 In fact, Turkey had begun to prioritize 
her national interests over the Americans’ who until then “followed the American 
initiatives automatically.”123 According to the Turkish policy makers, it was time to get 
rid of the image that Turkey was a satellite of the United States. 
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Opposition from the leftists was also considerable after President Johnson’s letter. 
Some leftist press organizations and student groups raised their voices and blamed the 
U.S. for “meddling in Turkish domestic politics.” They also renewed their allegations, 
regarding the Westernization process of Turkey, as the branch of Western Imperialism 
that would eventually terminate the independence of the Turkish Republic. In this light, 
leftists pushed for a break-up both from NATO and the U.S.124 According to the rightists, 
these ideas were so extremely Communist that their real intention was to gain more votes, 
rather than actually implementing what they were pushing for. 
President Johnson’s letter was the main factor that woke up Turkish officials to  
follow a more credible foreign policy. Since it became clear that Turkish and American 
interests were not symmetrical, but asymmetrical, Turkey shifted its policy into a multi-
lateral dimension. In order to achieve national interests, Turkey realized that instead of 
the one-sided, sharpened policies of the cold war, it should follow multi-dimensional, 
softened policies. The gradually increasing number of international players also had 
certain effects on this shift of Turkish foreign policy. 
On the other hand, Turkey, from 1964 to 1967, supported impartiality in Middle 
East conflicts. Turkey preferred to stay neutral in order to avoid pushing itself into a 
conflict with either the United States, the Soviets or the Arabs. Experiencing the lessons 
learned in the Cyprus Crisis, Turkey “voted for the Yugoslav resolution calling for the 
Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories” after the 1967 Arab-Israel War. 
“Potential Arab votes in the UN, as well as the future Communist bloc support for its 
position on Cyprus” were vital motivations for the new Turkish policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict.125 In addition, anti-Americanism played a great role in this new policy as 
was written by a Turkish commentator: 
The Arab-Israeli clash was the last development to have a big influence on 
our foreign policy although it did not directly concern the U.S.…Those 
who infer passivity from the principle ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’ 
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may question the wisdom of supporting the Arabs, that is, the Eastern bloc 
and the non-aligned countries. But, even they should admit that our 
foreign policy needed a shake-up. Turkey had to save herself from the 
‘satellite’ complex, which was felt by the public.126  
Yet, Turkey maintained her cautious approach to the Middle East conflict in order 
to prevent complete alienation with the Western allies, by rejecting the “Soviet resolution 
that labeled Israel an aggressor.”127  
Due to the sense of isolation related to the Cyprus dispute, Turkey began to 
question whether it would remain a member of NATO in 1966. General opinion was that 
the United States would support Turkey against a Russian attack. But, the likelihood of 
becoming weak, due to a shortage of military equipment if it withdrew from NATO, kept 
Turkey back. “Moreover, withdrawal from the alliance would seriously weaken Turkey 
in its conflict with Greece over Cyprus, since the United States might well increase 
military aid to Greece at Turkey’s expense.”128 
When Greek attacks on the Turkish community intensified, Turkey renewed its 
threat of military intervention on Cyprus in November 1967. “It was averted only by 
American and United Nations mediation that led Athens to promise withdrawal of many 
illegal Greek troops on the island…”129 This time Turkey was more satisfied by 
American efforts that “had persuaded the Greek mainland government to accept the most 
important Turkish demands, and thus helped to restore the standing of the United States 
in the eyes of Turkish opinion.”130  
Another consequence of anti-Americanism that gained momentum after President 
Johnson’s letter, was the revision of the “bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement” 
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in 1969.131 By 1964, Turkey and the United States had signed fifty-five agreements 
concerning the situation of the United States’ soldiers on Turkish territory. These 
agreements were not submitted for the approval of the Turkish National Assembly. 
Following the Cyprus Crisis in 1964, “the opposition parties demanded publication, 
cancellation or revision of the bilateral agreements, which they submitted, violated 
Turkish sovereignty, reintroduced the ill-famed capitulatory system of Ottoman days, or 
was inconsistent with the constitution.”132 The opposition left party claimed that a 
significant portion of Turkey was occupied by the United States.133 Furthermore, it was 
alleged that Turkey had no control of American facilities inside Turkish territory. 
Therefore, Turkish armed forces requested expansion of their authority over these 
facilities. In this context, “[Turkish authorities] sought essentially a thoroughgoing 
reaffirmation of Turkish sovereignty and control over every facet of military cooperation 
with the United States…the Ankara authorities wished the agreement to state specifically 
that all joint defense cooperation would take place pursuant to the NATO Pact and within 
the limits of NATO commitments.”134  
According to American officials, Turkish attitudes towards these American 
facilities were more sensitive than those of other NATO allies. Americans shared the 
same ideas as the Turks as far as pursuing NATO commitments, yet Washington wanted 
“to preserve rights to import supplies necessary for the morale of its troops and to operate 
certain services—such as the armed forces radio stations—which were sometimes heavily 
criticized in the Turkish Press.”135 
On June 3, 1969, the revised Defense and Cooperation agreement became 
effective. In this agreement, Turkey re-emphasized its full-authority over American bases 
in Turkey and restricted all American military activities without consultation. In fact, all 
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these efforts were “to base American-Turkish relations concerning defense on a mutual 
respect for the sovereignty and equal rights of the two parties.”136  
It is important to mention that among these concerns regarding the restriction of 
American activities in terms of the Defense and Cooperation Agreement, “the six-day 
Arab-Israel War in June 1967 touched off a new paroxysm of concern lest the Americans 
mount military intervention in that conflict from bases in Turkey.” Since the Turkish 
government was under great domestic pressure, it could hardly approve such an action.137 
E. TURKISH SOLDIERS ON THE ISLAND 
From 1967 to 1974, Turkish and Greek officials worked on a solution for Cyprus 
in which Athens offered Enosis “with some compensation to the Turks in order not to 
harm its ties with the Western alliances.” However, Makarios was not willing to give any 
concessions to the Turks. Furthermore, he was following up a “non-aligned policy and 
good relations with the eastern bloc” in contrast to the Greek interests. Thus, friction 
between Greece and Makarios increased until 1974.138 In the beginning of July 1974, 
Makarios enforced some counter-measures against the Greek population in Cyprus. 
Consequently, he demanded that Athens withdraw the Greek elements including Greek 
officers. Greece decided to intervene on the island by means of its own army located on 
the island. Thus, encouraged by Athens, Greek officers and EOKA-B, a terrorist 
organization on the island, executed a military coup on the Makarios government.139  
On 15 July 1974, events in Cyprus went from bad to worse, when President 
Makarios was replaced by the junta government of Greece. Nikos Sampson, the new 
president of Cyprus, “was the worst possible choice from every viewpoint, since he had 
virtually no support in Cyprus, and was notorious for his killings in EOKA’s campaign 
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against the British in the 1950s, and his hatred of the Turks.”140 The island became a 
scene of humanitarian crimes in 1974, which were filmed by Greek journalist Antonis 
Angastiniyotis.  Mr. Angastiniyotis did a study of the history of Cyprus and found out 
that 126 Turkish Cypriots living in Murataga, Sandallar and Atlilar villages, including 
women and children had been executed by the Greeks. Furthermore, the bodies of these 
people were thrown into a hole. Mr. Angastiniyotis’ Greek citizenship was revoked after 
his film by his own government.141 
Since these attempts were interpreted as a “kind of de facto enosis”142 by  the 
Turkish government, Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister, immediately flew to 
London to discuss a joint operation with the guarantee powers; Turkey, Greece and 
Britain. In London, Ecevit also held a meeting with Joseph Sisco, the U.S. undersecretary 
of state, who guaranteed to maintain American aid “despite Turkey’s military 
preparations.”143 
From the Greek junta’s point of view, the timing of the coup was perfect because 
Turkish-American relations were teetering due to the opium problem, so any Turkish 
attempt to intervene militarily would inevitably be restricted by the American 
government. On the other hand,, the American administration “was embroiled in the final 
stages of the Watergate Scandal, while…Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was 
preoccupied with the Middle East peacemaking, following the Arab-Israeli War of 
October 1973.”144 Therefore, in the beginning of the crisis, the U.S. was too far away to 
focus on Cyprus effectively.  
As a result, Kissinger neither put any efforts into overturning the coup in Cyprus, 
nor attempted to halt Turkish military intervention. “In fact, the Americans seemed to be 
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doing everything they could to help the Turks make up their mind that intervention was 
the only way they could get satisfaction.”145 America’s main concerns on the island were 
their intelligence and military facilities. On the other hand, they did not want the Greek 
junta to cause a war between Turkey and Greece, which would weaken the southern flank 
of NATO. In this context, the question was: why did the U.S. “pull its punches with the 
Turks,”146 in contrast to the 1964 and 1967 crises. Firstly, according to the American 
administration, this time Turkish intervention was inevitable. There was no way to 
prevent it. Yet they believed that a war between Greece and Turkey might be averted by 
containing the Greeks. Furthermore, the Greek army was too weak to prevent a Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus.147  
From Ankara’s point of view, the intervention was inevitable for good reasons. 
First of all, Turkey was opposed to having an enemy on its southern border due to 
security concerns. A Cyprus unified with Greece meant an extension of Greek borders, 
and Greece, which was at the south door of Turkey, was not friendly to Turkey at that 
time. Secondly, the London-Zurich agreement would be violated, which meant the denial 
of an international agreement and would be a detriment to the prestige of the Turkish 
Republic. Thirdly, although there were two communities on the island, one of them, the 
Turkish Cypriots, would be subject to the rule of the Greek Cypriots. This situation was 
unacceptable, not only to the Turkish government but also to the Turkish people who had 
already had an independence war with Greece and were very sensitive to their national 
feelings. Lastly, the fragile balance of power “in the Mediterranean and Aegean region, 
which was established by Lausanne Treaty,”148 would be violated, to the detriment of 
Turkey, due to the island’s strategic location. 
In contrast to Turkish views, the Athens Junta supported Enosis as that was their 
traditional and Hellenic goal. The junta “would prefer a Cyprus (or part of it) united and 
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docile to Greece…to a Cyprus functioning as an independent sister country of Greece in 
the Eastern Mediterranean whose interests, not only its ties of blood, would keep it closer 
to Greece than to any country in the area. This has come about because of the junta’s 
incautiously nationalistic approach, and because of its concerns to serve American 
interests in the belief that it thus furthers its own cause.”149 American and Greek junta 
relations were maintained at a satisfactory level until the military coup in Cyprus in 1974. 
Until that time, the U.S. supported a Cyprus unified with Greece as it avoided a Soviet 
intervention related to the involvement of Cyprus in NATO. Thus, Turkey was reluctant 
to act unilaterally on the island in case there was a second disappointment after President 
Johnson’s letter. 
However, after the coup took place in Cyprus, Washington implemented a “wait-
and-see policy.” Washington did not want a war between Turkey and Greece due to the 
coup in Cyprus, but refrained to apply any pressure on Athens since alienation with 
Athens might have jeopardized American bases and “strategic interests in 
Greece.”150When Kissinger realized that Turkey would intervene anyway, he was glad 
because the problem would be solved without any direct involvement of the U.S. that 
might have resulted in alienation of either side. Furthermore, being an ally of the U.S., 
Turkish intervention would not harm U.S. interests on the island and would prevent any 
Soviet intervention there.  
With some encouragement by the American administration, Turkey launched its 
military operation on 20 July 1974. Turkish armed forces proceeded for two days until 
they secured a beachhead. In fact, Turkish intervention was organized in two stages, 
which resulted in what would be limited “to a triangular area between Kyrenia on the 
north coast, the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia and Lefka in the north-west.”151 To  
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be frank, this plan was nearly the same as the U.S. contingency plan that had been offered 
in 1964. “It was as if the secret U.S. plans of 1964 had been played out in Turkey’s 
favor.”152 
On July 23, a ceasefire was established and the Geneva negotiations began on 
July 25. According to the U.S. Congress, Turkish troops were moving forward despite the 
ceasefire. After ceasing to blame the Turks for their actions, Kissinger explained why he 
supported Turkey at the expense of Greece. According to Kissinger,  
Turkey’s value to American security interests [was] higher than that of the 
Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece, Government. Turkey housed vital 
bases and sophisticated electronic listening-posts along the Soviet border, 
installations which made possible, for example, intelligence on Russian 
military moves of the kind that spurred the October nuclear alert during 
the Yom Kippur War the year before, and monitoring of Soviet missile 
activity.153  
During the negotiations in Geneva, Turkey accepted the American proposal 
offering a cantonal system on the island, which was rejected by the Greeks. Thus, Turkey 
decided to proceed to the second phase of the military operation. Turkish officials 
thought that this second operation would force the Greeks to reconciliation at the table, 
but this was not accomplished. Consequently, the Turkish government resigned and 
Turkish politics became unstable. 
F. AFTERMATH OF CYPRUS INTERVENTION 
After the second operation, opposition voices in Congress began to strongly 
criticize Turkish actions and President Ford’s ignorance on the matter. On February 5, 
1975, Congress approved a new resolution that banned all “military sales and aid to 
Turkey until the president could show that substantial progress had been registered 
towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem.”154  The reason for the embargo was the 
equipment used by the Turkish troops in the military operations. Since this equipment 
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was supplied by the U.S. for military aid, it was not supposed to be used in an operation 
against a neutral country. According to Turkish officials, “the embargo was a grave 
mistake [and military aid] to Turkey was not a favor but an essential obligation.”155 
Despite the intense efforts of the Ford Administration to lift the ban, the ban would 
remain effective until 1978. According to the president, the ban would do nothing to 
improve the situation but might jeopardize “the system…in the Eastern Mediterranean 
[where it] has been based for 28 years.”156  
Turkish response appeared immediately, stressing a revision of the American 
facilities in Turkey.  Defense Secretary Schlesinger, “who had earlier criticized the 
Turks, now testified that the loss of intelligence stations in Turkey would be a 
disaster.”157 However, all these efforts to lift the ban failed. Consequently, Turkey 
declared a suspension of all the activities of the American facilities, “other than those 
deemed to have purely NATO function.”158 Additionally, the Defense and Cooperation 
Agreement of 1969 was propped up. The official response of  the Turkish Government to 
the American embargo was also noteworthy: “Over the last 30 years, Turkey and the 
United States have maintained friendly ties, have helped each other on matters of mutual 
security…The recent decision of the U.S. Congress, imposing an arms embargo on 
Turkey, is the expression of a mentality that misinterprets the basic philosophy 
underlying these relations and cooperation…Though the Turkish Government is pleased 
to note that the U.S. Governments’ views are in line with the Turkish stand concerning 
the attitude of Congress, a Turkish move to take account of facts and adopt counter-
measures is not only proper, but inevitable…”159 
In October 1975, the embargo was partially lifted due to intense efforts by the 
Ford administration. In fact, the embargo had hampered the benefits of the U.S. rather 
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than Turkey. Consequently, the agreement on 26 March 1976 enabled the Americans to 
resume their activities on the bases in Turkish territory, but mandated sharing all 
intelligence material. That same year, the U.S. awarded Turkey a significant amount of 
credit.160 
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter “lobbied Congress to lift the embargo,”161 even 
though he had not promised to do so in his election campaign. As a result, the ban was 
revoked on August 1, 1978. In the end, NATO’s integrity, especially its southern flank, 
was successfully held, the Soviets were out of the game, and “the balance of power in the 
Eastern Mediterranean had been successfully shifted in favor of America’s most strategic 
important ally there.” Cyprus was the best place to keep an eye on the Soviets’ nuclear 
activities. Hence, the U.S. took advantage of three monitoring facilities in Northern 
Turkey, which had been closed during the embargo.162 
Cyprus, despite a direct connection regarding mutual relations, was related to 
Turkish national interests primarily, but was not a top priority as far as American 
interests were concerned. Yet as a global power, Washington had certain interests in the 
island. Turkish-American relations experienced a conflict of asymmetric relations 
between the two countries. What is primary to one side, did not match in terms of priority 
on the agenda of the other. Since one of them was a regional power, and the other a 
global power, the interests diverged. Although common strategic interests continued to 
exist, this divergence gave birth to some collateral damages such as the arms embargo.  
G. OPIUM PROBLEM 
From 1968 to 1974, Turkish-American relations were shaken because of the 
opium products grown by Turkish farmers. In 1968, Richard Nixon, the upcoming 
President of the U.S. in 1969, carried out his election campaign promising to solve the 
narcotics problem, which “was a main source of crime in the United States. [Since] 
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Turkey had come to be identified as one of the main sources of opium and its derivatives 
reaching the American markets long before Nixon’s bid for presidency,”163 the United 
States government began to exert harsh controls over Turkey “to prevent the illegal 
trafficking of opium in Turkey.”164 The American Congress was in favor of a resolution 
that would ban all opium production in Turkey. Being aware of this situation, Turkish 
officials increased controls over the production and transportation of opium in the 
country. While there were thirty provinces in which opium was grown in 1961, it was 
decreased to four provinces by 1971.165 
According to the Americans, every year the number of people addicted to heroin 
was going higher and higher. John E. Ingersoll, the director of the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs, explained it in 1970 as  
Ten years ago we estimated there were 60,000 narcotic addicts in the 
United States; today we believe there are two to three times that 
amount.166  
However the main problem was the correlation between “heroin addiction and the 
increase of crime,” that was proven by some U.S. law institutions. Moreover, this evil 
habit had destroyed many American families.167  
As the issue became a serious matter due to pressure from the public and the 
press, congressmen and other officials pushed for a survey regarding the sources of 
heroin and pointed out possible counter-measures against whoever was responsible for 
the illegal trafficking of heroin in the U.S.  Turkey was singled out to be the provider 
opium to the U.S. population according to the reports of the Bureau of Narcotics and 
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Dangerous Drugs, which indicated that “about 80 percent of the heroin illicitly 
introduced into the United States was derived from opium diverted from Turkish 
production.”168  
In contrast to the American officials, Turkey did not admit to being the sole 
country, or “even the primary source” responsible for the heroin in the States. Ankara 
mentioned that a ban on opium cultivation in Turkey would not end heroin addiction in 
the U.S. as demand would continue. Furthermore, there were other countries such as 
Soviet Russia, India, and so forth, which were responsible for the heroin in the States but 
they were not condemned.169 Indeed, domestic pressures were on the scene again, and the 
U.S. administration had to lend an ear to domestic voices so as not to lose votes that 
would result in sacrificing Turkey for some time. Yet, Turkey was willing to cooperate 
with the U.S. in terms of a solution to the addiction problem. 
Since opium “was an important source of income for some Turkish farmers,”170 
Turkey asked for economic aid from the United States to replace opium with another 
product. In this context, the United States lent Turkey three million dollars in 1968. After 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs declared that “eighty percent of 
the illicit drugs on the U.S. market came from Turkey,” Congress began to think of 
options such as cutting off all aid to Turkey until it banned the production of opium.171  
In 1971, the situation deteriorated into a deadlock. From the Turkish point of 
view, Turkey had implemented effective controls on the production of opium and was not 
responsible for the illegal drug traffic in the U.S. Furthermore, American proposals, in 
terms of aid, were insufficient to replace opium production on which a significant number 
of farmers were dependent for survival in Turkey. On the other side, Americans, putting 
the entire blame on Turkey because of illegal trafficking in their home country, rejected 
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all options other than a total ban of opium production in Turkey. The “criticism of Turkey 
grew and went so far as to question Turkey’s utility to the United States.”172 
The deadlock was overcome after a military coup d’état in Turkey in 1971. On 30 
June 1971, Turkey declared that it had banned opium cultivation “because of [its] 
humanitarian obligations.”173 This complete ban was appreciated by the United States. 
On the other hand, protests and anti-American emotions reemerged in the Turkish public. 
The majority of critics in Turkey were focused on the unfairness of the ban according to 
which indeed “Turkish opium had gone to meet demands of the pharmaceutical industries 
and these would now turn to India as an alternative supplier.”174 As a result, “Turks were 
outraged in August 1972 when they learned that the United States had decided to ask 
India to increase its opium production to meet the world-wide shortage estimated by the 
International Narcotics Board.”175 
Despite these tough controls over Turkish opium, there were no significant 
indicators related to the decline of the illegal drug problem in the United States. 
Furthermore, “it was becoming apparent that eighty percent of the illicit heroine in the 
U.S. had not come from Turkey after all.” As a result, the general sense among the 
Turkish people was that the ban had nothing to do with its purpose, but “deprivations on 
Turkey.” This emotion stirred up objections to lift the ban. 176 
“Eventually, in July 1974, the succeeding civilian government under Bulent 
Ecevit, Turkish Prime Minister at that time, revoked the ban, but implemented measures 
to prevent diversion into the illegal market by enforcing what was known as the ‘poppy 
straw process’ of harvesting.” 177  Congress responded very strictly to the lifting of the 
                                                 
172 Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the 
Cold War,” 127. 
173 Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the 
Cold War,” 127. 
174 Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 10, 11. 
175 Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the 
Cold War,” 127. 
176 Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 11, 12. 
177 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, 154. 
 54
ban. Firstly, the United States called its ambassador to Turkey back to Washington. Then, 
Congress worked on numerous drafts of resolutions “asking for the imposition of 
embargoes.” When Congress passed a final resolution allocating power to the President 
to cut off “all assistance to the Government of Turkey” on August 1974, Turkish 
politicians were fully occupied by the Cyprus intervention.178 
In July and August of 1974, relations between Turkey and the United States 
quickly deteriorated. While dealing with the opium problem on one hand and the Cyprus 
intervention on the other, Turkey needed American support as much as ever. But, 
“Turkish government and the Turkish public were outraged at Congress’ eagerness to 
adopt coercive measures against a loyal ally. The Ecevit government further judged 
Congress’ action as an indication of insensitivity toward Turkish national interests. The 
fact that when the coup took place in Cyprus, the United States ambassador to Turkey 
had already been recalled to Washington, and Congress was discussing ways to penalize 
Turkey symbolically, illustrates the lack of trust between two countries.”179 Eventually, 
the, opium problem was overshadowed by Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus on 20 
July 1974. Nevertheless, the opium issue continued to be a problem until 1975. 
According to the declarations of the American government in the summer of 1975, 
Turkish efforts were interpreted as sufficient and strong. After the testimony of “the U.S. 
undersecretary of state Joseph Sisco and the U.S. ambassador…in the house of 
representatives [pointing out] that Turkey‘s measures in controlling trade had proven 
effective,” the opium deadlock was erased from the agenda.180 
H. CONCLUSION 
The Americans’ main interests in Cyprus were to protect the integrity of NATO 
and American facilities on the island, and to prevent an intervention by the Soviets. In 
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this context, Kissinger’s prior choice, Turkey, might be explained as a way “to maintain 
Turkey’s commitment to the eastern flank of NATO,” who might announce its neutrality 
in case a “full-scale conflict with Greece” occurred. Furthermore, this might be perceived 
as an invitation for the Soviets to intervene. Thus, the U.S., who saw the military 
intervention of the Turks as inevitable, preferred to deter the Greeks instead of the 
Turks.181 On the other hand, Turkey, encouraged by the U.S. administration, acted on its 
own to provide a stable and secure future for Turkish Cypriots, but in the end, was faced 
with a strict embargo implemented by Congress, in which ethnic ties became 
significantly important. However, the embargo had a minor effect on Turkey because 
Turkey was still able to get arms from other European NATO allies, such as Italy.  
In comparison with President Johnson’s letter, the 1974 Cyprus Crisis had had 
less of an impact on the Turkish public. In contrast to 1964, student demonstrations were 
not significant in quantity. The reason for tranquility among the Turkish people at this 
time, in contrast to the protests against President Johnson’s letter in 1964, was because 
the people understood that the Ford administration was making an effort to influence 
Congress on behalf of Turkey. 
Yet, Turkish policy makers were still vexed by the effects of ambitious Greeks 
lobbying for Congress to penalize Turkey. As a result, Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime 
Minister, declared in 1978 that the Turkish government would decrease the level of 
“cooperation with the United States and NATO on the grounds that the Soviet Union no 
longer constituted a threat to Turkish security.”182  Furthermore, according to Ecevit, 
“smaller allies did not need to correlate all of their foreign policy actions with those of 
the superpowers.” Turkey, while maintaining its membership to NATO and Cento 
(Central Treaty Organization, also known as the Baghdad Pact), would follow its own 
interests rather than others.’183 
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To conclude, the honeymoon period during 1945–1964 between Turkey and the 
U.S., turned into frustration, disengagement, and anti-American sentiments in Turkey. 
President Johnson’s letter and an intolerant approach to Turkey’s specific interests in 
opium paved the way for Turkish alienation. Nevertheless, some of the disagreements 
between the two countries, which strongly affected the relations in this period, may be 
summed up as follows: 
 
• National feeling is the most important element in a Turkish citizen’s life. 
Thus, the perception of the U.S. in terms of support against a historic 
enemy like Russia would be described as friendly. But, when the threat 
disappeared,   an American presence might be perceived as an “occupier” 
and an imperialistic power. 
• There was a significant difference between U.S. officials in Turkey and 
the Turkish public. Furthermore, the disparity in social culture emerged as 
a hindrance between the two societies. Instead of expressing mutual 
tolerance of the reciprocal life styles, and encouraged by the deteriorated 
atmosphere in the relations, intolerance and antipathy spread among the 
public. 
• Domestic politics were to occupy a significant space in the relations. The 
Turkish government, which was seen as the puppet of the American 
administration by the public, ventured certain unilateral acts in order to 
maintain stability as well as their position. On the other hand, American 
politics was dominated by Greek-Americans, which have superiority in 
comparison to Turkish-Americans at about a 25:1 ratio.184 
• Turkey became aware of the fact that due to its one-sided foreign policy, it 
was left alone in the international arena. Hence, Turkey decided to revise 
its foreign policy to the detriment of its relations with the U.S. In fact, 
Turkey was too busy to find its own identity in this period. 
• Lastly, the Turkish Labor Party, which appeared in this period, provoked 
anti-Americanism among the Turkish public. Although their pro-
Communist approach was not adopted by most of the Turkish population, 
they took advantage of press organizations to influence the public.185 
 
Turkish-American relations, by the end of 1970s, had been significantly reduced. 
However, global developments and increased tensions between the superpowers paved 
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the way for Turkey to re-emerge as a key country because of its geographical position. 
“The Iranian Revolution of February 1979 meant that Turkey was now the West’s only 
ally in the northern tier, and its value as a listening post and barrier to any potential 
Soviet advance into the Middle East was reinforced.”186 The concerns of the Americans 
regarding the future of the region were boosted when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan at 
the end of 1979. All these developments made Turkey seem to be in “an arc of crisis.”187 
Eventually, the tendency of Turkish-American relations to always move toward 
improvement might be interpreted as the final destination. With respect for this final 
destination, the Reagan administration declared its intention to bring the “Turkish-
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IV. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1980-2003 
This is the period that clearly proves the argument of this thesis to be true. Despite 
significant deterioration in terms of Turkish-American relations in the previous period, 
the 1980s and afterwards witnessed a real strategic partnership between Turkey and the 
U.S. As always, the common threat, Communism, pushed both countries onto the same 
page and pushed trivial matters down the agenda. This time both countries were more 
aware of the sensitivities of the other. In this context, until the 1990s, further military 
cooperation stood out as the most important element on the agenda. This military 
cooperation was furthered by economic cooperation since Turgut Ozal initiated the new 
policy of Turkey as “trade not aid.” It was the Gulf War that began to turn the 
relationship into a strategic partnership. The Gulf War and its aftermath, the crisis in the 
Balkans and Caucasus, redefined and revalued Turkey’s strategic importance to the U.S. 
Thus, the previous frictions, before the 1980s, were replaced by strong cooperation. 
However, due to the effect of “strength and size”189 and the locational variations, this 
strategic partnership diverged on  some issues. Since Turkey was a weaker and smaller 
ally than the U.S., Turkish reactions differed from those of the U.S. Moreover, since the 
U.S. is located in a remote geographical position, and Turkey is located close to the 
regions where the main issues on the agenda took place, there were significant 
differences in terms of approaches to the issues. Nevertheless, as this thesis argues, 
Turkey and the U.S. are two “indispensible”190 allies. Even though it was in an 
atmosphere of real deterioration, the countries would find a way to improve their 
relations due to the important common interests at the top of the agenda. 
In the area of cooperation during this period, military issues appeared. The U.S.–
Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was renewed after 
pending for five years. Washington decided to modernize some aspects of the Turkish 
military industry. Consequently, economic relations improved and Turkey began to be 
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seen as a “Little America” during Prime Minister Turgut Ozal’s time. This cooperation 
against Communism was expanded in the first Gulf War. Turkey was the first country to 
back up the UN economic sanctions. Furthermore, Turkey was eager to back up the U.S. 
diplomatically in international areas. Afterwards, the Balkans again witnessed further 
cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. Turkey participated in military campaigns 
against the Serbs, and then afterwards, solidified this participation by contributing to the 
SFOR and KFOR stabilization forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. Following that, Central Asia 
showed up as another source of cooperation. To contain the Soviet influence over the ex-
Soviet countries in the region, Turkish influence was supported by the U.S. 
administration by means of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In addition, the U.S. supplied 
financial aid to Turkey via the IMF after the economic crisis in Turkey in 2001. 
American efforts, in terms of the integration of Turkey into the EU, were appreciated by 
Turkish politicians and the public. Lastly, cooperation on terrorism after 9/11 was the 
keystone in terms of the strategic dimensions of the relationship. 
In contrast with areas of cooperation, there were also areas of conflicts in the 
period. To begin with, despite of the renewal of DECA, American soldiers were not 
totally free as far as their actions towards the Middle East on Turkish bases. The military 
aid supplied to Turkey by the U.S. was another headache in this period. Then, the 
periodic renewals of the alleged Armenian Genocide caused enhanced tensions. The high 
volume of condemnations of Ankara, regarding the violation of human rights in Turkey, 
dragged relations to the edge of fragility. The divergence in terms of the approach to Iraq 
was the most sensitive part of the conflict. Ankara’s efforts to end the economic sanctions 
on Iraq, after the war, fell upon deaf ears in Washington. More importantly, Ankara was 
not in favor of any partition or federation in Iraq, but U.S. actions were interpreted as 
paving the way for partitions. Lastly, Erbakan, the head of the Welfare Party, became a 
problem, during this time, due to his efforts to turn Turkey to face east rather than west. 
However, despite all these conflicts, cooperation was much better during this 
time. The fields of cooperation were more concrete, important, strategic, and permanent. 
In contrast, the fields of debates were abstract, tactical rather than strategic, less 
important, and temporary. The issue of Iraq’s reestablishment would be excluded from 
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the points of cooperation as there was still a problem regarding the status of the Kurds in 
Northern Iraq. Nevertheless, this problem could have been resolved with mutual 
understanding as it was not as big a problem as it had been before.  
A. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL 
1990 
When the aggressive attitudes of the Soviet Union reemerged in the 1980s, 
Turkey and the U.S. continued to share the same concerns in terms of Communism, 
especially when Ronald Reagan came into power. The concerns of the U.S. intersected 
with Turkish security concerns when some American diplomats were captured and taken 
hostage at the American Embassy in Iran. Hence, Turkish policy makers were pushed to 
draw their interests in compliance with the U.S.’ again. Eventually, as the first sign of an 
improvement in relations, the U.S.-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (DECA), which the two countries “had been haggling over for five years,” 
was signed on March 29, 1980.191 According to DECA, the U.S. wanted to keep  the “use 
of twelve of its most vital bases in Turkey, including Incirlik and essential intelligence 
gathering stations,” while returning  the facilities entirely back to Turkish authority.192 
After the conclusion of DECA, the cooperation between Turkish and American 
companies improved. This cooperation yielded a common project,  FNSS, which “is a 
Turkish based joint venture company between the Nurol Group of Turkey and the BAE 
Systems” of the U.S.193 This project was aimed at producing armored vehicles for the 
military.  
After the coup d’état took place in Turkey on September 12, 1980, the 
improvement in Turkish-American relations reached a peak. Since the commanders’ 
approach was strongly pro-American, the alliance with the U.S. became the first priority 
of Turkish Foreign policy.  Parallel to these improvements, the U.S. decided not only to 
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modernize some airports in Turkey under a  “Memorandum of Understanding,”  but also 
“to take its support of Turkey’s military systems one step further by helping to finance 
the country’s efforts to modernize its troubled air defenses and its defense industry 
program.”194 Furthermore, in 1981, the amount of aid supplied to Turkey increased 
significantly since the 1974 Cyprus intervention. In fact, this military aid “peaked at U.S. 
$715 million in 1984.”195  
The amelioration of Turkish–American relations in the beginning of the 1980s 
was indeed the result of the “policy changes in the United States.”196 When the Soviet 
threat reemerged, the U.S. supported a strong and stabilized ally, Turkey, in the region. 
Therefore, the 1980 military d’état in Turkey was welcomed by the U.S. administration. 
In order to overcome the Soviet threat, the Reagan administration increased the defense 
budget, which benefited Turkey. The common perception of an extreme threat paved the 
way for both countries to act unanimously toward many issues on the world’s agenda. 
Turkish strategic importance was acknowledged and reaffirmed by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle when he said,  
In the time that it would take the United States to deliver a division to the 
upper Gulf in the event of an emergency there, the Soviets could easily 
deliver 10 divisions…If Turkey is strong then a Soviet Military 
commander considering a move into a critical region like the Gulf would 
have to think twice. He would have to think twice because eastern Turkey 
is within striking distance of those critical Soviet forces based in 
Transcaucasus.197 
Turkey experienced its golden age regarding Turkish–American relations, when 
Turgut Ozal, the leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), was elected prime minister in 
the 1983 elections. Soon after being elected, Ozal expressed his eagerness to make 
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adjustments related to the Bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement.198 In 
fact, his intentions were very clear. When he declared his slogan to be “trade not aid,”199 
he attempted to lift U.S. tariffs and pave the way for entrepreneurs to improve economic 
relations with the U.S. Eventually, “American subsidiaries set up a whole range of 
enterprises from soft-drink bottling plants, to pharmaceutical plants, to aircraft assembly 
plants.” Turkish cities began to look like “Little America” due to the investments of 
American companies in areas such as construction, telecommunication, and so forth.200 
Moreover, Turkey not only purchased some F-16s from the United States, but also began 
to manufacture in this field201 by sharing a program with General Dynamics regarding 
the production of F-16 airplanes. 
Ozal was able to pave the way for Turkish businessmen, who were encouraged by 
the liberalist politics of Turgut Ozal, “to lobby Congress on topics of interest to their 
companies.”202 In addition to these improvements, Turkey and the U.S. agreed to settle a 
Rapid Deployment Force and renovate some Turkish airfields, adding two new ones to 
eastern Turkey in order to secure Turkey’s Eastern areas in case of a Soviet attack.203 
Consequently, after the mid 1980s, Turkish–American relations lost their 
momentum due to a shift in the Soviet policy. When Gorbachev became the head of the 
Soviet Union in 1985, he pursued a friendlier relationship with the United States and its 
allies. The Soviet and American governments progressed on negotiations in terms of the 
elimination of weapons in 1985, which concluded with the Intermediate Range Nuclear 
Force Treaty (1987) that stipulated the termination of medium and short-range weapons 
in the near future.204 
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Although the Soviet Union was still a threat through the end of the 1980s, its 
peaceful and friendly approach towards the Western World pushed Turkey to question its 
importance relevant to containing the Soviets as the Southern flank of NATO. Since 
Turkish foreign policy was based mainly on its appeal to its allies in terms of containing 
the Soviets, the decrease in the perception of the common threat, Communism, would be 
harmful to Turkish vital interests, especially military aid from the U.S.  
B. SOME IRRITANTS IN THE 1980S 
Despite strong cooperation after the 1980s, some areas became problematic. To 
begin with, Turkey restricted American activities on American bases in the Middle East 
and the Persian Gulf towards American bases in Turkey, which in return, discomforted 
U.S. officials. One reason for the restriction of American activities might be explained by 
the sensitive approach of the Turkish public to its national sovereignty, which played a 
large role in the government’s decision process.  
In addition, in 1983, Turkey was irritated with Congress’ proposal “that military 
aid to Greece and Turkey must be extended at a 7-to-10 (Greece: Turkey) ratio.” The 
Greek lobby’s effect was explained in Monteagle Stearns’ book as follows: 
“Congress…agreed on a definition of ‘Aegean Balance.’ Accepting the views of Greek 
government, a congressional majority, spearheaded by an articulate coalition of 
philhellenes, liberals and conservatives with significant Greek-American constituencies 
decided that the Aegean status quo would not be threatened if U.S. military assistance to 
Greece and Turkey were appropriated in a seven-to-ten ratio.”205  Turkey denounced the 
ratio as unjust since the geographic conditions of both countries differ in terms of hostile 
neighborhoods. Yet, Turkish efforts were ignored by Congress, which in turn wounded 
mutual relations. Indeed, Turkey realized that it suffered an ineffective lobby in 
Washington, in comparison with the Greek and Armenian lobbies, despite the attempts of  
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Ozal. Beside the bids to consolidate relations with the U.S., Turkey was a little slow in 
understanding how politics operate in Washington. For this reason, Turkish-American 
relations were sometimes wounded. 
Related to the lack of a good Turkish lobby in Congress, the Greek lobby pushed 
Congress to attach the same level of aid to Turkey to the improvement in the Cyprus 
dispute. Furthermore, the U.S. was uncomfortable when “Turkish Cypriots declared an 
independent Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus in the fall of 1983, and that Ankara 
recognized this entity as an independent country.”206 Ankara had no option but 
recognition, since this was related to national sovereignty, and no one could stand against 
the extreme domestic pressure regarding the Cyprus debate. On the other hand, although 
the U.S. administration was more tolerant and understanding of Turkish domestic 
concerns, lobbies still had the most power in Congress. Hence, the Reagan government 
pursued the idea of softening the counter-measures against Turkey.  
As the Cold War began to slow down, Turkey started to worry about the amount 
of military aid supplied by the U.S. Therefore, “after the expiry of the 1980 DECA in 
1985, Turkey pushed hard for stronger guarantees on aid deliveries and signed a new 
DECA only after U.S. secretary of State George Shultz agreed that the administration 
would vigorously press Congress on this issue.”207 Nevertheless, the military aid, which 
was increased to $715 million in 1984, dropped back to $526 million by Congress in 
1988.208  
One of the more confrontational issues concerned the domestic issues of America 
related to the aggressive Armenian attitudes towards Turkey and Turkish diplomats in the 
U.S.  In 1972, the Turkish Consul General, Mehmet Baydar and his Vice Consul, Bahadir 
Demir were killed by an Armenian-American, Gourgen Yanikas, in Santa Barbara.209 
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Ten years later, Kemal Arikan, the Turkish Consul General, was killed by Hampig 
Sassounian in Westwood, California.210 Although afterwards, sufficient counter-
measures to protect Turkish facilities and diplomats were enforced by the U.S. 
government, “these events colored the Turkish reaction to the rising tide of Armenian 
agitation pressing Congress to pass resolutions condemning Ottoman [alleged] Turkish  
‘genocide’ in the large scale of the [alleged] killing of Armenians in 1915,”211 which 
was, in this author’s opinion, a relocation of the Armenians due to the security concerns 
of the Ottoman Empire at that time. American Armenians worked hard to influence the 
Congressmen of the U.S. to pass the resolution every time, but still it failed. Usually, 
California senators supported all of these proposals, where the Armenian population was 
significant. Beginning in the mid-1980s, these [alleged] ‘genocide’ proposals were 
renewed every year and regularly defeated by the republican administration. As a result, 
these proposals “failed to be enacted” and were called “blackmail” by the Turkish 
government.212 In fact, Armenians were trying to cover their attacks in the U.S. against 
Turkish-American communities in those years by renewing the alleged genocide 
proposal.213 On the other hand, as mentioned in Article 11 of the Armenian constitution, 
Armenians claimed that some eastern parts of Turkish territory belonged to them. And, 
they had a plan consisting of four stages to regain these territories from Turkey. As Harut 
Sassounian, the publisher of the Courier California newspaper mentioned, the first stage 
was to introduce the alleged Armenian Genocide to the world, which was accomplished. 
The second stage was to force Turkey to acknowledge the alleged genocide. The third 
stage was compensation from Turkey for the alleged genocide, and the last stage was to 
put some eastern Turkish territory inside Armenian borders where the alleged genocide 
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occurred.214 Turkey, however, objected to the Armenian claims in order to stop the 
Armenian plan of demanding territory from Turkey. 
Another contentious issue in the 1980s was the increasing Kurdish insurgency, 
which was a domestic problem until the “Kurdish Workers Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) 
set up its training camps in neighboring countries, and when the tactics used by the 
[Turkish] government to fight the insurgency were criticized by the Western World.”215 
Even though in the very beginning of the 1980s, Turkey was charged with systematic and 
widespread violation of human rights by the European countries, “the Department of 
State took the position that ‘there is no evidence that brutality and torture are widespread 
and systematic.’” However, by 1989, “the tone had changed” and U.S. officials began to 
report serious violations and the denial of human rights. Some of these violations were 
described as restrictions on freedom of thought in regards to journalists and writers. 
According to U.S. reports,  the Turkish press and its writers were not free to express their 
thoughts. Although the Bulent Ecevit government worked on it in 1999, Washington was 
not satisfied with Ankara’s efforts.216 In fact, Washington’s critics were focused on 
Article 301 of the Turkish constitution, which stipulates punishment for those people 
“insulting Turkishness.” Hence, the U.S. claimed that this article impeded freedom of 
thought in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey was condemned by the U.S. “for waging a full-
fledged war against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL.”217  
Frankly, it was easy to understand the different stands of the U.S. in the early and 
late 1980s. In the beginning of the 1980s, the world witnessed the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Shah revolution in Iran, and the taking of American 
diplomats as hostages in Iran. The emergence of the Soviet threat and instability in the 
Middle East pushed the U.S. to strengthen its alliance with Turkey, who was sharing the 
same concerns as the U.S., and pursuing an alliance. Thus, the U.S. put a blind eye to the 
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international calls related to the alleged violation of human rights in Turkey. However, 
when the Soviet threat faded at the end of the 1980s, the U.S. began to focus on Iraq, 
which made it shift its policy towards Turkey. 
Although some areas of conflict were to continue, Turkish-American relations 
were maintained at a high level from 1980 to 1989. Turkey kept taking economic 
advantage of the alliance by “counting on increased U.S. investment and greater access to 
U.S. markets to offset reduced aid.” Some American companies, such as General 
Dynamics, FMC, and so forth, filled out the space that “compromise[d] a pro-Turkey 
corporate lobby,” which Turkey was lacking before.218  
On the other hand, the containment of the Soviets was facilitated by a trustworthy 
ally, Turkey, for the U.S. “American installations in Turkey facilitated the detection and 
interception of Soviet airpower into the Eastern Mediterranean [and] Turkey’s land mass 
and bases deterred Soviet designs on the Persian Gulf.”219 
C. POST-COLD WAR ERA 
The Soviet Union’s surrender to an intervention in Eastern Europe and the 
reunification of Germany ushered in a new era in which “Turkey’s role as a bulwark 
against the Communist threat on NATO’s eastern flank”220 faded significantly.  Turkish 
foreign policy witnessed a period of instability and uncertainty. In fact, the end of the 
Cold War abolished the most important reason for Turkey to stay attached to the West, 
especially the U.S. Therefore, Turkey proceeded to define her importance to the West in 
other ways in an effort to refrain from completely separating from the West, which would 
be at odds with Ataturk’s policy. 
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Since Turkey’s strategic importance declined as a “front line state against the 
Soviet Union”221 in 1990, Turgut Ozal “portray[ed] Turkey as the West’s bridge to the 
Turkic states on Russia’s southern border,”222 which was an insufficient attempt to 
revitalize Turkey’s strategic importance. The 1990–1991 Gulf War presented a more 
promising opportunity for Turkey223 “to reaffirm Ankara’s commitment to U.S.-Turkish 
bilateral relations and to highlight Turkey’s importance to U.S. strategic interests and 
concerns in the Middle East.”224 
On August 2, 1990, the stability in the Middle East was broken down when 
Kuwait was invaded by Saddam Hussein’s forces. Saddam’s aggression launched a new 
field of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. as both countries’ concerns “tended to 
converge” in terms of “expansionist policies of regional states that threaten[s] to alter the 
status quo.”225 Although hesitant to take active precautions in the beginning, Turkey 
decided to shut off the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and relations with Iraq were propped 
up temporarily.226  Turkey’s reluctance to join the coalition forces in the beginning could 
be explained by strong opposition in the parliament and among the public. Both the left 
wing and the right wing in the parliament, as well as the public’s concerns, were focused 
on the “alleged adventurism”227 of Turgut Ozal. Since the future (after the war) was 
cloudy, and Turkey might be severely damaged by Saddam’s missiles, these opposition 
groups did not want to sacrifice the ongoing Turkish neutrality policy to American 
interests in the region, which might jeopardize Turkey’s political and economic status. 
Yet Turkey was the “first nation in the region” to condemn the invasion and “to support 
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the UN sanctions…by shutting down Iraq’s pipeline.”228 Furthermore, after intense 
debates between the government and high-level military officials, 100,000 Turkish 
soldiers were mobilized to the Iraqi border, “pinning down substantial Iraqi forces.”229 In  
addition to these, Turkey supported the U.S. not only militarily, by allowing Americans 
to use the Incirlik base for operations in Iraq, but also diplomatically, by backing up the 
Bush administration on international platforms.230 
Turkey extended its support of the United States in the following years. After the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Balkans witnessed brutal ethnic conflicts. As in the Gulf 
War, the opportunity for instability and altering the status quo, put Turkey and the U.S. 
on the same page again. When the violence in the Balkans began to increase, Turkey 
replaced its passive diplomacy with an active one in Europe and the international arena in 
order to contain the brutal attacks of the Serbians against the Bosnian Muslim 
Community.231 Although the U.S. had followed a non-intervention policy towards the 
Balkans in the beginning, afterwards they were persuaded to adopt an active policy to 
move the conflicts from Bosnia to Kosovo. 
As a result of the U.S.’ active policy, the Dayton Agreement was signed on 21 
November 1995, which was welcomed by Turkish officials and the public since “Bosnia-
Herzegovina was reconstituted…as a single state.” 232  As a result of the Kosovo crisis 
between 1998–1999, NATO launched an air campaign against Serbia, which was 
followed by “an international peacekeeping force, known as KFOR” to prevent Serbian 
violence over Kosovar Albanians.233  
Turkish-American cooperation had solidified on both platforms. In Bosnia, 
Turkish soldiers worked with U.S. soldiers in the “NATO Enforcement/Stability Force 
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(IFOR/SFOR) that was established to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.”234 Moreover, Turkey participated in the “armament and the training of the 
Bosnian Federation Army” program, which was “appreciated by the Americans” since it 
stopped the Iranians from extending their influence over the Balkans.235 In the Kosovo 
case, Turkey backed up the peacekeeping operations of the U.S. and contributed to the 
NATO force by a number of F-16s.236 
Another area of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. was Central Asia. After 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, new Turkic countries that were excessively 
vulnerable to instability emerged. In this case, the U.S. encouraged Turkey to take an 
initiative towards these countries in terms of “shaping their system in accordance with 
democratic and secular models.”237 The U.S. aimed to prevent the expansionist 
movements of Russia and Iran using Turkey, due to Turkey’s historical ties. In 
compliance with its goal, the U.S. reinforced the idea of constructing the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline in a variety of other options. Additionally, the Turkish undertaking of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation Project (BSECP) was appreciated by the U.S., as it was in 
total agreement with the U.S.’ interests,  and “Turkey would be able to affect the political 
and economic development of the former Soviet countries in the Black Sea region in such 
a way as to foster democratic political systems and capitalist economies in these newly 
independent states.”238  
Turkish-American cooperation was kept going in the Middle East by using Israel. 
Turkey signed defense cooperation agreements in February and August 1996 with Israel 
that included joint military exercises, permission for Israeli naval forces to utilize the 
Turkish ports, and for Israeli air forces to operate training flights over designated parts of 
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Anatolia. The mutual relations were strengthened by Suleyman Demirel’s “official visit 
to Jerusalem” after the agreements. These improvements were appreciated by the U.S. 
administration as the balance of power in the Middle East was tending to the U.S. side to 
deter Iranian influence in the region.239 Furthermore, Washington hoped that the Turkish-
Israel alliance would facilitate the “Palestinian-Israeli peace process.”240 Turkey started 
pursuing friendlier relations with Israel, since Israel was a trustworthy ally in terms of 
defending against ballistic missiles. Then the alliance promised an opportunity for the 
Turkish government to contain the “power of Iran, Iraq and Syria.” But, without a doubt, 
Turkey’s primary goal in establishing an alliance with Israel was to gain the support of 
the Israeli lobby in the American Congress against the Greek and Armenian lobbies.241 
The U.S. gave its full support to the Turkish government both on Customs Union 
and European Union issues. Eventually, Turkey became a member of the Customs Union 
in 1996 in which the U.S. was a trusted supporter of the Turkish government. 
Additionally, Washington was willing to put pressure on Europe to the benefit of Ankara 
regarding the integration of Turkey into the EU, which in return became an irritant in 
terms of transatlantic relations with both Europe and the U.S.242  
Contrary to the European countries and some international institutions, in terms of 
the Turkish government’s fight with the separatist Kurdish Workers Party 
(PKK/KONGRA-GEL), the U.S. “concurred with [Ankara’s] claims that human rights 
violations were neither systematic nor government sanctioned, but the result of police 
officers taking the law into their own hands.”243 Also, the U.S. appreciated Turkey for 
improving its democracy and democratic institutions. The most important part was the 
cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. against  the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Washington 
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declared the PKK/KONGRA-GEL a terrorist organization and supplied the Turkish army 
in its fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. In February 1999, pro-American voices spread 
among the Turkish public when Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the terrorist organization 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL and accused of creating 30,000 Turkish martyrs, was captured by 
the CIA while leaving the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and delivered to Turkish 
Intelligence Officers. 
The year 1999 witnessed reciprocal visits of high-level politicians between two 
countries. First Suleyman Demirel as the president of Turkey, then Bulent Ecevit as the 
prime minister visited the U.S. In return, President Clinton made a visit to Turkey in 
November in which he patted a kid’s head in Golcuk, which had suffered from an 
earthquake. While his friendly attitude was appreciated by the Turkish public, the, head-
patting event was criticized by the press as simply a gesture to curry American favor.  
Nevertheless “these visits strengthened the strategic nature of the relationship,” since 
Clinton described the mutual relations as a strategic partnership in his speech at the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1999.244 
On November 22, 2000, Turkey had to struggle with a significant financial crisis 
that had deteriorated when the IMF refused to pay money that it had previously 
promised.245 When the IMF declared that Turkey did not meet the standards for 
borrowing any more money, Turkey needed help from Washington. Finally when the 
U.S. administration operated as a conciliator between Turkey and the IMF, the IMF 
supplied the amount of 10 billion dollars to Turkey. When another economic crisis 
emerged in February 2001, Washington, under the Bush administration backed Turkey in 
its “negotiations with the World Bank and IMF.”246 
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D. PROBLEMATIC AREAS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA  
As the common threat faded, Turkey was concerned that its strategic importance 
would not appeal to the U.S. anymore. Thus, Ozal took the responsibility on his own, 
despite strong objections from the military and other elite parties, and joined the coalition 
forces in the Gulf War. His main goal was “to reestablish Turkey’s strategic importance 
in the eyes of Western powers, especially the United States.” In other words, he wanted 
“to reinvent Turkey’s value to the West.” Consequently, from his point of view, the 
overthrow of Saddam would bring democracy to Iraq, by which government control in 
Northern Iraq would be reestablished, resulting in the termination of PKK/KONGRA-
GEL activities in the region.247 In addition,, Ozal wanted to have a say, after the war, in 
terms of the re-establishment of Iraq. In contrast, elite parties and military officials were 
worried about the uncertainties of the future, so they stood up for neither risking  
Turkey’s status quo nor participating in the coalition against Iraq.  
The main divergence in partnership emerged in terms of the “approach to Iraq.” 
For the U.S., overthrowing Saddam and the “collapse of Ba’athist regime in Baghdad” 
were at the top of the agenda. From Washington’s perspective, this should be “achieved 
through the enforcement of UN-backed economic and trade sanctions.” Moreover, 
Washington was in favor of supporting opposition groups against Saddam, including the 
Kurds, in the Northern part of Iraq.  Contrary to American views, Ankara was eager to 
restore economic relations with Iraq immediately after the war, as it was not satisfied 
with American compensation, due to the shut-off of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. 
Furthermore, American attitudes encouraging the Kurds in Northern Iraq against Saddam 
raised significant concerns as this could result in “the emergence of an autonomous 
Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq,” which would undoubtedly affect the Turkish struggle 
against separatist Kurdish movements.248  For Ankara, nothing was more important than 
Iraq’s territorial integrity. 
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Consequently, the U.S. encouragement of Kurdish leaders,Masoud Barzani and 
Jalal Talabani “to revolt against Saddam Hussein’s regime” ended up with a brutal 
suppression of rebellions by Saddam. As a result, “thousands of Kurdish refugees fled to 
Iran[ian]”and Turkish borders. Due to the cloudy future and heavy economic 
responsibility regarding the refugees, Turkey proposed forming a security zone above the 
36th parallel in Northern Iraq, “where the Kurds would be protected and a no-fly zone 
would be established.” Rather than a solution, the enforcement of security and a no-fly 
zone became a problem for Ankara as the region (above the 36th parallel) appeared to be 
a safe heaven for “anti-Turkish, Kurdish guerrilla activity and a base for the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL to launch attacks into Turkey.”249  
Worse than this was the American report calling “the Turkish Kurds  a minority” 
and reminding Turkish officials of their responsibilities “concerning basic human 
rights.”250 It was clear that the U.S. administration did not let Turkey have any freedom 
of action, in terms of its struggle with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, when Steny H. Hoyer 
stated in Congress:  
Passage of this bill sends an unequivocal message to the government of 
Turkey that this Congress will conduct business as usual when U.S.-
supplied equipment is used against civilians.251  
Turkish human rights gradually became an issue in America, especially during the 
Carter administration. At the end of the 1990s, U.S. reports were publicly “criticizing 
Turkish practices rather strongly, objecting to torture, administrative detention, 
restrictions on free speech, and the like.”252 Hence, the U.S. pushed Ankara to be more 
sensitive to human rights. 
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Turkish-Greek conflicts had important effects on Turkish-American relations. The 
U.S.’ position between the two countries was very delicate. Both sides wanted the U.S. to 
support its policy over the other one. Thus, U.S. actions were always criticized by both 
sides. Cyprus was still a headache in the post-Cold War era. The Clinton administration 
was strongly protested by the Turkish public in 1998, when Richard Holbrooke, 
American mediator for Cyprus, put the failure of his attempts on Turkish Cypriots and 
announced “1974 Turkish intervention as a violation of the 1959 London-Zurich 
accords…”253 
The Caucasus also emerged as a tricky area in the relations. Since Russia was still 
a threat to Turkey, Ankara gave strong opposition “to the Russian violations of the 1990 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in the northern Caucasus and the re-
stationing of  Russian forces along Turkey’s borders in Georgia and Azerbaijan,”254 
which fell upon deaf ears in Washington. The friction in relations regarding the Caucasus 
reached its peak when the Turkish press claimed that the U.S. was supplying arms instead 
of humanitarian aid to the newly established Armenia, with Turkey being used as a 
corridor. Turkey then prohibited using its territory for humanitarian aid through Armenia. 
Consequently, Congress excluded Azerbaijan “from U.S. assistance by Section 907 of the 
Freedom Support Act,”255 which, in return, was condemned by Ankara. As always, the 
Armenian lobby in Congress was the “hero” for this kind of decision. 
Another fragile period was the 1996-97 Erbakan-Ciller coalition government 
period. Necmettin Erbakan was the head of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). His first 
intention was to reduce Turkey’s commitments to the Western world in terms of NATO 
and so forth. His plan was to turn Turkey’s face towards the Islamic countries, 
specifically “cultivating relations with Libya, and Iran, two of the United States’ most 
prominent betes noires in the Middle East.”256 The irritation of the U.S., due to 
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Erbakan’s Islamist movements, became publicly clear when Morton Abramowitz, a 
former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, gave a speech saying, “How do you deal with a 
NATO ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO, fundamentally anti-Semitic, 
and fundamentally pro-Islamist, even when he’s largely behaving himself?”257 In 1997, 
Erbakan resigned due to pressure from high-ranking military commanders. 
Nothing could be trickier than dealing with Iraq in terms of Turkish-American 
relations. As Abramowitz put it in 1993, “The most significant American strategic 
interest in the region remains containment of Iran in the long term and of Iraq right now 
because of the U.S. commitment to protect the Kurds of northern Iraq. One day the 
United States may have to decide how committed it is to the seemingly contradictory 
goals of protecting the Kurds and preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity.”258 As 
Abramowitz predicted, in 1998 the Kurdish problem in Northern Iraq reemerged. When 
Kurdish groups began to fight with each other, the U.S. gathered the Kurdish leaders in 
Washington DC yielding a peace agreement between the Kurdish groups. Turkey was 
rankled by the U.S.’ attitude as Turkey was not invited to the peace process. However, 
the most disturbing part for Turkish officials was “the call for a federation.” Because 
Turkey strictly opposed anything “more than a local autonomy,” Ankara’s response came 
immediately, and “upgrad[ed] its diplomatic ties with Iraq to ambassadorial level.”259 
Any partition or federal system in Iraq would harm Turkish interests because it might 
provoke a similar demand in Turkey’s southeastern territory that could result in extensive 
conflicts or fights. Nevertheless, in the following months, the U.S. administration took 
steps that eased Ankara’s concerns, by promising to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity. 
Another irritant in 1998 was the dissatisfaction of Ankara due to the insufficient 
pressure Washington put on Syria. Turkey initiated a strong-willed military campaign 
against PKK/KONGRA-GEL activities and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1998. Hence, 
Syria was forced to stop giving support to the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and Abdullah 
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Ocalan. However, in the beginning, the U.S. was reluctant to take any active steps since it 
was afraid of destroying the Syria-Israel peace process. But afterwards, when 
Washington enhanced its support of Turkey and captured Abdullah Ocalan, the tension 
was relieved.260 
The Desert Fox Operation in 1998 created more friction in the relations. The U.S. 
and British Forces launched air strikes towards Iraq to destroy MWD using the Incirlik 
air base. When Ankara complained about not being consulted, Turkish and American 
Military officials held a meeting in 1999 that resulted in amendments to the “Document 
of Engagement Rules,” “signed among the military authorities of Turkey, the United 
States, and Britain.”261 
In addition, Greek and Armenian lobbies increased tensions between Turkey and 
the U.S.  They typically used military and economic aid as a weapon, by threatening to 
decrease them, which eventually ended in 1998. At irregular intervals, the Armenians 
pushed Congress to pass a resolution regarding the alleged genocide of the 1914 
relocation. The last proposal before 9/11 was rejected by the Clinton administration, but 
Ankara was prepared with a counter plan.262 Yet, Armenian and Greek lobbies were still 
much more influential in the U.S. compared to Turkish lobbies. 
The last quarrel before 9/11 was regarding “the legitimacy of the U.S. attacks,” 
which intensified over Baghdad after the election of George W. Bush in 2000. 
Aggressive attitudes towards Iraq were met with great concern in Ankara, blaming the 
U.S. for “having no clear policy toward that country.”263 However, all these tensions and 
divergences were replaced by cooperation after the 9/11 attacks. 
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E. 9/11 ATTACKS AND AFTERWARDS 
Although the younger Bush was reluctant to give support to Ankara in terms of 
the IMF, after the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, due to the strategic importance of 
Turkey in an age of vague threats, Bush adopted the policies of his predecessor, President 
Clinton. He took advantage of economic aid as an instrument to improve Turkish security 
and its “westward-orientation.” Ismail Cem, who was the Foreign Minister of Turkey at 
that time, made a visit to Washington, and solidified the strategic partnership and 
cooperation between two countries “regarding the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP), the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Turkish Israeli ties and Iraq.”264 Thus, the 
infrastructure of further cooperation before 9/11 was almost ready. 
When the 9/11 attacks occurred, Ankara was one of the very first countries to 
strongly condemn the terrorist attacks as Turkey had suffered from terrorism for almost 
seventeen years. Turkey saw this chance as an opportunity to carry out its fight with 
terror on international platforms and obtain the support of other countries. Hence, Ankara 
decided to contribute to all Washington’s efforts in terms of terrorism, both 
diplomatically and militarily.  
When Washington declared “Iran and Iraq rogue regimes” and initiated a military 
campaign against terrorist activities all over the world, Turkey’s strategic and moral 
importance was revalued in the eyes of American policy makers. Thus, the priorities in 
the relations between Turkey and the U.S. were to slide again from an economic 
dimension to a security and military dimension. In this context, “the prosecution of the 
war against terror, halting the spread of WMD…and enhancing Turkey’s utility as a 
strategic ally and a member of potential coalitions of the willing,” moved to the top of the 
agenda.265 
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Ankara abided by its promises and even went further, which enhanced 
expectations in Washington. First of all, American troops were authorized to use Turkish 
airbases for operations against terrorism. Moreover, Turkey took command of the 
“International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from July 2002 to 
January 2003, providing 1,400 of the total 4,500 ISAF troops.” Turkish-American 
cooperation was extended to “terrorism consultations in which Turkish officials shared 
their experiences in fighting terrorism with American officials.” Turkey contributed to 
the anti-terror efforts in Florida by deploying military officials there. Indeed, molding 
international opinion in its fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL was not Ankara’s only 
aim; it was pushing to be actively involved in the efforts against terrorism.  Being a 
Muslim country, Ankara was afraid of being exploited by the ignorant fundamentalists, 
which might in return appear as a “threat to the secular Turkish state.”266    
Additionally, Turkey benefited from improving its strategic importance in the 
eyes of its Western allies, as not only a democratic and secular Muslim state in the 
middle of a troubled area, but also in the economic area by emerging as the most secure 
and trustworthy country for the “energy corridors of the Central Asia and the Caucasus.” 
When this opportunity coincided with the strategic interests of the Bush administration, 
Turkey’s economic agenda gained a brand new momentum. On the other side, the U.S. 
supported Turkey in its initiatives and enhanced cooperation with Ankara in certain areas. 
In fact, this was a clever policy for Washington as the fight against terrorism was 
interpreted as a war between Christians and Muslims. To get rid of this image, the U.S. 
looked to Turkey’s support as a strategic ally, which demonstrated to the world that 
Washington’s war on terrorism was not just against Muslims, as the population of Turkey 
is 99 percent Muslim.267 
Despite intense cooperation in terms of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” a 
significant gap between the policies of both countries towards Iraq began to appear. In 
March 2002, this gap became clear when Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit spoke in the EU 
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meeting stating, “it is not necessary to undertake a military operation… [That] Iraq has 
been under strict control and is not in a position to inflict harm on its neighbors.”268 In 
the following months, Ankara’s willingness to cooperate with Washington over terrorism 
was replaced by considerable concerns, due to increasing pressures and requests from 
Washington. After Congress authorized the Bush administration to launch a war against 
Iraq in October 2002, Washington’s requests unfolded as  permission to use Turkish land 
for “American forces in order to wage a war from a northern front, to influx a total of 
80,000 American soldiers and 250 fighter aircrafts to Turkey” and assignment of some 
Turkish “airports and harbors…for the use of the United States and the Coalition 
Forces.”269 Even though these requests were renewed often, the Turkish government was 
able to put them off until March 1, 2003. When the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
rejected all the American requests and denied the location of American forces on Turkish 
territory, Turkish-American relations stepped into a new era. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In a general sense, Turkish-American relations experienced their best time since 
World War II after the 1980s, with very few exceptions. Both countries’ approaches 
towards each other were more tolerant, more sensitive to problematic areas and “more 
understanding.” Although the international structure had witnessed an important change 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in contrast to the expectations of 
deterioration in Turkish-American relations, due to the absence of the threat of 
Communism, Turkish-American relations continued to proceed in a cooperative manner 
much better than the period before the 1990s.270  
The new environment after Soviet integration, revalued Turkish strategic 
importance to the U.S. Turkish military cooperation with the U.S. was extended to the 
                                                 
268 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, 345, quoted in Nicole Pope, “Concerns Over Iraq,” 
Middle East International, March 22, 2002, 19. 
269 Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions 
in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 38, 39. 
270 Aydin and Erhan, Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future, 104. 
 82
Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia, which appeared as new areas of trouble. The 
energy reserves in the former Soviet countries, and their distribution to the allies via safe 
energy corridors, occupied an important part of the agenda in terms of cooperation.271 
Consequently, the common initiatives against the Serbian’s aggressive intentions of 
genocide in the Balkans solidified the alliance. Then, Turkish policy makers welcomed 
Washington’s full support for Ankara to be included in the European Union.  The war on 
terrorism had improved the “strategic partnership” between two countries. 
However, there were still some important areas of discomfort in the relations 
between the two countries in this period. As usual, the weakness of the Turkish lobbies in 
Congress was exploited by the strong Armenian and Greek lobbies, which ended 
economic and military aid and the attempts to pass a resolution regarding the alleged 
genocide of the Armenians under Ottoman rule in 1915. The most important attempt was 
pulled back by the Clinton administration in 2000. Another irritant period was during the 
1996-97 Erbakan government, due to Erbakan’s friendly policies towards the Islamic 
countries, which were to be kept under control, according to Washington. Erbakan’s 
attempts to shift Turkish policy from West to East ended with the commanders’ strict 
warning in February 1997 that deposed the Erbakan government.  
The main divergence in the relations, after the 1980s, took place due to differing 
approaches to Iraq and the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Cooperation in the Gulf War faded 
after the policies of both countries began to conflict. Turkey’s main concerns regarding 
the integrity of Iraqi territory and a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi problem, rather than a 
military solution after the Gulf War were not satisfactorily taken into consideration by 
Washington. Moreover, Washington’s unilateral attempts for reconciliation between 
Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq, from which Turkey was excluded, increased the level of 
concerns in Ankara. In addition, the U.S.’ reports, which turned into a condemnation after 
1995, of Turkey, in terms of human rights regarding Turkey’s war on terrorism with the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL, in contrast to the previous years, opened a gap in the relations. 
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Despite all this friction, Turkey stood up for the U.S. as “an indispensible 
country” as Turkey is located in the center of recently developing American policies 
regarding “the rediscovery of geopolitics on Europe’s periphery especially in the Caspian 
and growing emphasis on the challenges of weapons of mass destruction and missile 
proliferation and regional power projection.” From the Turkish point of view, the U.S. is 
the only country and superpower, other than Europe, that is capable of improving the 
peace process in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. According to Turkish 
foreign policy makers, improving its relations with the U.S. would enhance Turkish 
security, economic and political benefits, and its role as a regional power in an area of 
uncertainties. Thus, the Turkish-American relationship strengthened in the period of the 
1980s until 2003 under the terms of the strategic partnership. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
above, the strategic partnership did not bring the two countries to the same page in terms 
of all the issues on the agenda.272  
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V. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER 2003 
The regained momentum of the relations in the previous period decelerated 
through the end of 2002 due the run up to the Iraq campaign and got stuck in 2003 at the 
outbreak of fighting. Ultimately, this process accorded greater patterns, observable in this 
study, within the Turkish-American strategic partnership. Since Turkey had previously 
evaded a patron-client relationship and torn away from dependence on the U.S. for its 
foreign policy, Ankara’s multi-lateral foreign policy ended with some uneasy feelings 
between the two countries. Until the Second Iraq war, Turkey backed almost all 
diplomacy by the U.S. around the world. However, during this period, Turkish and 
American strategic interests seemed to diverge over Iraq on some definite issues, which 
are mentioned below. Thus, Turkey broke away and followed its own policy. Since the 
Bush administration did not get the approval of the UN for its Iraqi campaign in 2003, 
Turkey hesitated to give full support to the U.S. Moreover, in the 2002-03 episode, the 
disputed area was on Turkey’s southern border, pushing Turkey to be more careful., As a 
result of bilateral frictions described below, Turkish-American interests were 
significantly damaged. Nevertheless, after a detailed revision of foreign policy in the 
further course of the present decade, each side realized that it was unable to proceed 
without the other. In this context, despite some incidents in 2003, Turkish-American 
relations began to improve, especially after the low point of 2004. The history of security 
cooperation was renewed by all sides; as the author argues, Turkish-American relations 
are fated to improve. After each respective shock comes an improvement because this is 
the destiny of the relations and because Turkey and the U.S. share the same principles at 
the core; only the details vary. As a result of these messy details in crisis, relations 
worsened again in 2003, but improved after 2004.  
The Iraq War of 2003 was the worst experience in the Turkish-American 
relationship in modern history. This experience was entirely contrary to the previous 
“patron-client relationship,” since this time Turkey resisted American demands, and at 
the end, rejected the most important one of them:  a Turkish axis of assault on Iraq and a 
kind of northern front from the perspective of American troops. The significance of the 
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second Turkish front border was derived especially from its closeness with the 
operational and tactical areas of combat, in terms of logistic and personnel support. 
Hence, the tension escalated, deepening the wounds of the bi-lateral relations. The 
derailed relations required significant repair once the initial campaign ended and the 
protracted conflict took hold in Iraq with the insurgency. Due to these problems,, mutual 
visits were conducted to repair the diplomatic and security relations.  
On the other side, Turkish-American relations solidified and became more 
tangible in terms of strategic concept via “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to 
Advance the Strategic Partnership” in this period. A strategic partnership necessitates 
sharing the same core principles, since it means a long-term partnership on the basis of 
common ideology. Thus, it is also a strong indicator that the Turkish-American 
partnership will continue long term, despite conflicts in the recent short term.  
A. DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THE IRAQ INVASION 
The Turkish-American agenda gradually became occupied by Iraq, from the 
beginning of 2002. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit met with U.S. President George 
Bush on January 16, 2002, which was interpreted as the start of intense Iraq diplomacy 
between Ankara and Washington. Neither side could reach a consensus in this meeting 
since American attitudes were more in favor of a unilateral action, without caring so 
much about Turkish sensitivities regarding Iraq. This divergence went to some degree of 
extremism when George Bush declared “Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ 
in his speech on January 29, 2002,” referring to a strong fight with these countries. In 
response, General Tuncer Kilinc, Secretary of War Academies,273 pointed out the 
opportunity for Turkey to shift its foreign policy, in terms of warmer relations with Iran 
and Russia ,274  in case of chaos in the Middle East.  
Yet, this divergence was halted by a Turkish military mission, as the commander 
of the ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, for an eight-month period from June 
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2002 until February 2003. Turkey participated in ISAF with 1,300 personnel during this 
period.275 Once again, Turkey proved its willingness and loyalty to cooperate with the 
U.S. in terms of the fight against terrorism. Indeed, Turkey intended to demonstrate its 
willingness to fix the damaged relations. As a response to these friendly Turkish steps, 
Paul Wolfowitz, 25th United States Deputy Secretary of Defense,276 was hosted by Bulent 
Ecevit in his office. Wolfowitz delivered the U.S. administration message to Ecevit 
regarding the expectations of the U.S., related to the positive inputs of Ankara towards a 
possible operation in Iraq. Wolfowitz also underlined that the U.S. would carry out this 
operation with or without positive Turkish input, yet the U.S. administration would take 
care of Turkey’s sensitivities on Iraq. Following Wolfowitz’s demands, Ecevit reminded 
him of Ankara’s sensitivities and diplomatic red lines, and insisted on Iraq’s political and 
territorial integrity, preventing the formation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and 
protecting the Turkmen population in Iraq. Ecevit strongly emphasized these issues and 
defined the controversies on these issues as unacceptable.277  
The next month, in August 2002, the U.S. arranged a meeting in Washington for 
the Kurdish leaders of Northern Iraq. Ankara was  very rankled by this as Turkish 
officials were not informed about it and not even included in the meeting. Turkish 
exclusion from the process in Northern Iraq increased apprehensions in Ankara. These 
apprehensions coincided with the visit of Russian Assistant Foreign Minister Sultanov to 
Ankara, who offered cooperation with Turkey “against a probable operation” of the U.S. 
Turkey held its position and waited until the forthcoming elections in November, as 
Turkey was hoping for a peaceful solution in the region.278  
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One of the main concerns of Ankara was the legitimacy of the possible operation. 
Due to the refusal to sanction the operation in the United Nations, Ankara was reluctant 
to give full support to the United States. In this context, Turkish concerns, in terms of 
legitimacy, were conducted to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell by Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer, Turkish president at that time, “during the World Summit…in Johannesburg on 
September 4, 2002.”279 
The next month, the Bush administration became impatient about “waiting for any 
UN security Council resolutions,” and the U.S. Congress authorized President Bush to 
wage war on Iraq on October 11.280  Consequently, American demands from Turkey 
became clear and were explained as: permission for “site inspections”281 and the 
settlement of “eighty thousand American soldiers and 250 fighter aircraft”282 in Turkey, 
utilization of some airfields and ports in Turkish territory, unlimited utilization of Turkish 
territory in terms of logistic traffic and flights.283 All these demands were subject to the 
approval of the Turkish National Assembly, and would not be decided on until after the 
Turkish elections, which were to be held in nineteen days. Thus, Turkish 
parliamentarians suspended these demands until after the elections, since they would be a 
significant responsibility for the Turkish parliament, in an environment of strong 
objections from the public. The Turkish public believed that the war in Iraq was unjust 
and that only the UN could legitimize it. Besides, George Bush’s mistaken use of the 
word “crusade” regarding the Iraq War inspired conspiracy theories in the Turkish 
public’s mind, regardless of Bush’s apology.  
In compliance with its demands,  the U.S. seemed to understand Turkish concerns 
about Iraq when Robert Pearson, the American ambassador to Turkey at that time, 
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verified that his government opposed not only an independent state in northern Iraq, but 
also an unbalanced representation in the central government of Iraq related to the 
Turkmen population (which would eventually have a chair for the Turkmen population 
around the table for oil resources). Pearson admitted that the government of Iraq should 
involve the representation of all the groups living in Iraq.284 Therefore, U.S. officials 
gave the impression that they acknowledged Turkish interests in Iraq. 
On November 3, 2002, AKP (the Justice and Development Party) became the new 
government of Turkey after the general elections. Following the elections, Hilmi Ozkok, 
chief of the general staff, conducted a visit to the U.S. in which he clarified Turkish 
concerns about a possible operation in Iraq. These concerns included: the sanctioning 
problem of the operation by the UN, Turkish economic suffering before the first Gulf 
War due to unsatisfying compensation by the U.S., and the future of the Kurds related to 
a possible independent state in the northern part of Iraq. 285 
In the early days of December, Wolfowitz came to Turkey and renewed American 
demands, but this time complaining about the slow process of the Turkish bureaucracy. 
Abdullah Gul, prime minister of Turkey at that time, pacified Wolfowitz by assuring him 
that site inspection might proceed with the accompaniment of Turkish personnel with 
their American allies, but that other demands were still subject to parliament’s approval. 
To accelerate the process, Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s upcoming prime minister, was 
invited to Washington.286 Tayyip was also reluctant to give full support, since the Bush 
administration guaranteed Iraq’s territory, but did not promise compensation for 
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since a significant mobility, in terms of logistical transportation for the American staff  
was waiting at the Turkish-Iraqi border after the meeting, which was reported to the 
Turkish public by the Turkish media.287  
Yet, war was the last choice, according to the Turkish Government, a statement 
that was released to the Turkish press on January 3, 2003 by the secretary of the Turkish 
presidency as:  
War in Iraq is a last resort. There is still hope for a peaceful solution. In 
order to start a war, there must be international legitimacy. UN Resolution 
1441 would not approve a military action. Turkey has red lines in terms of 
Iraq. These are the territorial and political integrity of Iraq, and the future 
of Mosul and Kirkuk.288 
As a follower of Ataturk’s policy, “peace at home, peace in the world,” Turkey 
was still hopeful for a peaceful solution in terms of Iraq. Therefore, Abdullah Gul, prime 
minister at that time, started a tour of peaceful negotiations through the neighboring 
countries of Iraq. It started with Syria on January 4, 2003 and was followed by Jordan, 
Eygpt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Abdullah Gul emphasized the role of the neighboring 
countries in the region for a peaceful solution; however, he pointed out that Iraq was the 
country most responsible, and could prevent war if they would abide by the resolutions of 
the UN.289 
On the last day of January 2003, the Turkish National Security Council convened 
a long-lasting meeting regarding the situation in Iraq. In response to enhancing pressure 
from Washington in terms of utilizing the bases and deploying American soldiers, the 
council called for the legitimacy of a possible operation in Iraq as a resolution of the UN 
Security Council. Also, the Turkish approach towards Iraq was explained as an integrated 
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and unitary Iraq, not a federation. Lastly, it emphasized that in case of an attack on 
Turkey by Iraq, Turkey would retaliate with an “active defense.”290 
Despite Turkey’s intense diplomatic efforts, war appeared to be inevitable as the 
calendar proceeded. Therefore, Turkey had to develop new policies related to her own 
interests in case of war. First of all, the Turkish armed forces, in compliance with the 
announcement of the Turkish National Security Council on January 31, initiated some 
mobilization of troops and personnel over the Iraqi border, as a precaution against a 
possible war. In fact, this was reflected as a secret plan, in terms of cooperation with the 
U.S., which would end as the occupation of some part “of Northern Iraq behind an 
advancing American army.”291 This was interpreted as a bonus to Turkey since Turkey 
was eager to terminate the activities of PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Northern Iraq by means 
of a military operation. Yet, since the role of the Turkish army in this area was not clear, 
it was cancelled. Besides, Washington was still waiting for the approval of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for deploying its troops. As the first result of mutual 
understanding, TGNA approved “allowing American engineers to begin preparing 
Turkish military bases for possible use by American troops” on February 6.292 
After this time, it was obvious that despite some concerns, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) seemed to act together with the U.S., even when they did not 
want to, when peaceful solutions appeared impossible. However, they were restricted for 
some definite reasons. First of all, most AKP backers were conservatives who strongly 
opposed the war. To enable a resolution for the deployment of U.S. soldiers would most 
probably end up with a significant decrease in their percentage of votes. On the other 
hand, not only their own backers, but an important portion of the Turkish public (the 
leftists, rightists and almost all political views) was against the war. Milliyet, a popular 
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Turkish newspaper, conducted an opinion poll in January asking, “In your opinion, what 
should be Turkey’s role in a possible war on Iraq?” The results were quite apparent; 
70.72 percent did not want to be involved in the war in any way, 24.16 percent wanted to 
be involved after intense negotiations with the U.S., 3 percent mentioned a permission for 
just utilization of bases, and .12 percent declared their desire in terms of a second front 
line in Northern Iraq.293 According to Nasuh Uslu,294 these anti-war opinions reached 90 
percent in the following months. The main reason behind the opposition was the possible 
deterioration of the Kurdish issue after the war. According to public perceptions as well 
as the experience of the 1990-1991 war, the U.S. would establish a Kurdish state after the 
war. Additionally, there was significant distrust among the Turkish public as to American 
reasons for the war, including claims of the existence of biological weapons. Although 
the Turkish public believed that Iraq had biological and nuclear weapons, their perception 
of the reasons for the war was that it was not these weapons. Instead of these trivial 
reasons from the Turkish public’s perspective, Washington was pursuing  expanding its 
hegemony towards the Middle East and Washington’s main purpose was to seize the oil 
resources there. Furthermore, Washington did not intend to return to the homeland after 
the war, and would extend the war into Iran and Syria. In addition, Turkey had historical 
ties with the region and some Turkish people had relatives in Iraq and Syria, since the 
borders were drawn with a pencil on a table in the Lausanne Conference, without taking 
care of ethnical ties. For these resons, the Turkish people were strictly against the war.295 
Another irritant was one of the news releases in The New York Times indicating 
that “Turkish forces would be under American command”296 in Northern Iraq, which was 
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printed in the Turkish press the next day and provoked strong opposition among the 
Turkish people. Moreover, the amount of money designated by each side, in terms of 
compensation for the losses, was not equal. Indeed, there was a big difference in the 
amount that had been foreseen by each side. Turkey demanded $32 billion while 
Washington offered $6 billion to compensate for losses.297  
In the middle of all these debates, the calendar showed March 1, 2003 to be an 
important day in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, where there would be a vote for 
a second front line in Northern Iraq. The deployment of American equipment and 
soldiers, already waiting for the results of the vote on the Mediterranean Sea, just next to 
Turkish territory, hinged on this vote. The result was “264 yes; 250 no; with 19 
abstaining; however, the resolution required the approval of an absolute majority.”298 The 
assembly rejected the resolution that would enable American troops to be deployed on 
Turkish territory. This vote was an important keystone in the relations since it was 
interpreted as the second “serious blow” to the relations after Johnson’s letter of 1964. 
The U.S. was eager to wage war against Iraq, with or without Turkey, thus after the 
rejection of the resolution on March 1, President Bush “made a veiled warning to Turkey 
that it might end up missing its chance to have a say in the future of Iraq and lose a multi-
billion dollar aid package to protect its economy from the negative impacts of a war.”299 
As a result, in order not to be excluded from the future of Iraq, the Turkish 
Parliament reacted to Bush’s warning on March 20, 2003 by granting a new resolution, 
which “allow[ed] the U.S. to use Turkey’s airspace to cross into Iraq for airborne 
attacks.”300 On the same day, the U.S. declared war on Iraq in a campaign that presently 
showed the futility of pre-war political assumptions of the U.S. side and increased the 
need in the Turkish-U.S. bilateral relationship to repair the damage of the immediate past. 
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B. THE IRAQ INVASION 
Eventually, regardless of the decision of TGNA, Iraq was invaded by the U.S. on 
March 20, 2003. But, it would be useful to understand the reasons for TGNA’s rejection 
of the resolution. To begin with, Ankara and Washington did not have a consensus, 
especially on certain political and economic areas. Firstly, Turkey requested 
compensation of 32 billion dollars in a written promise, but Washington only promised, 
without a written document, 6 billion dollars “and up to $20 billion as a loan to be 
approved by the Congress and tied to IMF conditions.” Secondly, the situation in 
Northern Iraq was still unclear. Turkey wished to launch a comprehensive operation in 
Iraq with American soldiers in order to seize control of the region. Inevitably, this would 
enable Ankara to terminate the activities of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL to some degree, 
and to back up the Turkmen population in Northern Iraq. Moreover, this would 
discourage the Kurds, in terms of establishing a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. 
Eventually, Washington found itself in a dilemma. On one side, it did not want to alienate 
Turkey by rejecting Turkish demands, but on the other side, Kurdish leaders, who had 
been allies of the U.S. since the Gulf War, did not want Turkish soldiers inside Iraqi 
borders. Thus, the U.S. tried to put off Ankara by playing some diplomatic games. 
Thirdly, Turkish calls for participation in the “reconstruction of Iraq after the war” fell 
upon deaf ears in Washington. In fact, this was a result of Washington’s pro-Kurdish 
approach in Northern Iraq, since Ankara wanted participation in order to support the 
Turkmen population there.301  
Apart from these events, internal and international demonstrations affected the 
decision of TGNA. In Turkey, “from extreme left to extreme right, public opinion was 
against allowing the United States to deploy troops.”  In the international arena, most of 
the civil organizations, especially in Europe, were arranging protests against the U.S. 
Besides all this, the AKP had the opportunity to pass a resolution in TGNA, since they 
were more than the absolute majority in the parliament, but “How could the [islamist] 
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party…assist in a ‘crusade’ as President Bush had been unlucky enough to call it in the 
immediate aftermath of September 11, against the Muslim Iraqis?”302 
In addition, Turkey was focused on becoming a member of the European Union. 
When the U.S.’ intentions became clear, in terms of waging a war in Iraq, France and 
Germany opposed Washington’s intentions at a high level. Rumsfeld declared France and 
Germany to be the “old Europe” and added that Europe is not France and Germany. 
According to Rumsfeld, with the exception of these two nations, most of Europe was 
supporting the U.S.303 In this context, Turkey might not want to alienate two major 
powers of Europe by passing the resolution.304  
In any case, Turkish intentions, in terms of deploying troops to Northern Iraq after 
the invasion, stirred up some concerns among makers of policy in Washington. After the 
announcement of Prime Minister Gul about deploying some Turkish soldiers to Northern 
Iraq, Bush publicly declared that, “We have got more troops up north, and we’re making 
it very clear that we expect [the Turks] not to come into northern Iraq.”305 According to 
Washington, Turkish operations might cause conflicts between Turkish and U.S. soldiers 
“since the friend and foe identification system would not allow U.S. forces to distinguish 
Turkish troops from enemy Iraqi forces.” Moreover, Turkish operations would cause 
fights with Kurdish soldiers in the region “who were de facto controlling the region 
[Northern Iraq].”306  
Consequently, the friendly atmosphere of reciprocal relations for fifty years was 
replaced by an atmosphere of hostility and distrust, not limited to Turkey but wielded 
against other allies as well. Apparently, Bush used the word Turks, when opposing a 
Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq instead of saying “we advised our Turkish allies or 
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our Turkish friends” as “his predecessors” did.307 Since all his predecessors, including 
Bush, called Turkish politicians “our Turkish friends” until that time, Bush’s harsh tone 
emphasizing the word “Turks” was criticized. Furthermore, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy 
Defense Secretary, “openly criticized the Turkish military for not making good on its 
promise of support and called on Turkey to apologize for the decision of its 
Parliament.”308 On the first day of May, Bush announced that the combat war was over 
and the transformation period “from dictatorship to democracy” would begin.309  
Just two months after Bush’s declaration, Turkish-American relations worsened to 
the deepest point ever . On July 4, 2003, the Turkish Headquarters of Turkish Special 
Forces in Sulaymaniyah/Iraq was exposed to a military operation of U.S. soldiers. 
“Eleven Turkish officers were detained by” the Americans in an insulting manner. 
Referring to the American allegations, “Turkish commandos were plotting to assassinate 
the Kurdish Governor of nearby Kirkuk,” a statement that was firmly repudiated by the 
Turkish side. The Turkish Soldiers were taken to the American Headquarters “handcuffed 
and sack[ed] over the head.”310 Nevertheless, the Turkish officers were released after 
three days, but the public’s anger did not disappear. It would not be an exaggeration to 
say that this  was a fatal mistake in terms of the alliance. Since Turkish citizens are very 
sensitive to their national honor, history would witness another turning point in Turkish-
American relations.  
The results were dramatic.  The “Democratic Left Party (DSP) Chairman, Bulent 
Ecevit, said that the U.S. had ‘insulted’ Turkey. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 
leader, Devlet Bahceli, said ‘an apology should be made to Turkey’ while the True Path 
Party (DYP) leader, Mehmet Agar, said ‘it is an incident over which an ultimatum should 
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be made.’”311 According to Sanli Bahadir Koc, Turkey should request.a detailed 
explanation and apology for the incident from the U.S., a guarantee that these incidents 
would never happen again, and punishment for the responsible personnel. He also added 
that this should lead the Turkish public and critical institutions to an anti-Americanism 
that would not be a temporary one.312 This incident also became an issue in the movie 
“Valley of the Wolves in Iraq,” which left its viewers with anti-American feelings. 
C. TOWARDS DÉTENTE AND ENTENTE ONCE MORE, 2004-2008  
In the following months in 2003, both sides worked toward the improvement of 
the relations. On September 22, 2003, Turkish Treasury Minister Ali Babacan and the 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, John Snow, signed an economic agreement that supplied 
Turkey with a credit of $8.5 billion. But, it was tied to the condition of cooperation on 
some issues over Iraq. At the end of signature ceremony, John Snow expressed his 
positive anticipations in terms of relations, which were injured after the rejection of the 
resolution by TGNA on March 1.313 
Despite keen efforts, it was hard to return to the ‘Golden Age’ of the relations so 
rapidly. However, the atmosphere between the two countries appeared to be warming 
when a NATO summit was held in Turkey in June 2004. George Bush announced that 
Turkey was a model country, with its democratic and peaceful improvements in the 
region. A further step, in terms of improvement in the relations, was the addition of the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL to the terrorist organization list in Washington.314 At the end of 
2004, Marc Grossman, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, highlighted 
Turkish-American cooperation in terms of Iraq’s integrity, NATO, and “commitment to  
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freedom and democracy.” According to Grossman, the fluctuation of the relations during 
the Iraq War had come to an end, and it was time to further the cooperation. He referred 
to Secretary Powell’s speech:  
Turkey is a good friend, a good ally, and…notwithstanding [any] 
disappointment of a couple of months ago…we have a good partnership 
with Turkey and I’m sure it will continue to grow in the years ahead.315 
The warming atmosphere of 2004 moved its effect into 2005 and Turkey once 
again became the commander of ISAF in Kabul/Afghanistan. From February to August, 
Turkish Armed Forces contributed to ISAF with one of its brigades and some extra 
personnel.316  
Both Turkey and the U.S. have made intense efforts to repair the deterioration of 
the relations since 2003. In this context, reciprocal visits by high-level officials and 
politicians took place. The most important result of these visits was the “Shared Vision 
and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership,” which was signed by 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul. By 
this agreement, cooperation between the two countries was furthered and spread through 
other areas such as economy and technology. This document was a first in Turkish-
American history, which was accepted as “a road map defining the direction and the 
scope of the bilateral cooperation.” According to this document, the Turkish-American 
Economic Partnership Commission developed an ‘Action Plan’ that foresaw a 
“diversifying” in the relations in terms of “economy, trade, energy, investment, science & 
technology,  research & development programs, academic cooperation and human to 
human interaction.” This plan is still active and was last updated in April 2008.317 
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On November 5, 2007, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited 
President George Bush in the White House. The meeting was very friendly and delivered 
cooperation messages afterwards. President Bush described the PKK/KONGRA-GEL as 
the enemy of both Iraq and the U.S.318 In January, President Gul met President Bush in 
Washington.  After the meeting, President Gul said that Turkish-American cooperation 
against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL had solidified.319 The last important visit, in 2008, was 
held by Dick Cheney, Vice President of the U.S., on March, 24. The friendship between 
Cheney, President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan had been obvious to the press from 
the photographs. Gul and Cheney said the integrity of Iraq was the ‘common interest.’ He 
also advised Gul to enhance the political relations of the Turkish Republic with the 
regional Kurdish Communities and their leaders in Iraq. Furthermore, he asked for a 
tougher attitude towards Iran from Erdogan.320 Although the relations appeared to have 
improved and “to have turned the corner”321 since 2003, there were still points of 
discussion.  
D. CONTINUING SOURCES OF FRICTION AFTER 2003 
The biggest irritant in the relations was the protracted conflict in Iraq marked by 
the insurgency, which further unsettled the region into 2004-5. After the rejection of the 
resolution by the parliament on March 1, the relationship was harmed by consequent 
“shockwaves, leading to the deepening of the crisis,” which was called “a malaise in 
Turkish-American relations.” Wolfowitz got tough on the Turkish Military, thereby 
putting the whole blame on the Generals of the Turkish Army for having been passive 
during the vote of resolution. Wolfowitz exceeded the borders of courtesy in the eyes of 
the public when he declared, “let’s have a Turkey that steps up and says, we made a 
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mistake, we should have known how bad things were in Iraq, but we know now. Let’s 
figure out how we can be as helpful as possible to the Americans.” He also demanded an 
apology from Turkey. Turkish public perception was that Wolfowitz showed a woeful 
lack of respect for the Turkish Parliament and Turkish independence.322  
Another divergence in the relations related to the reconstruction of Iraq after the 
war. Since Turkey has historical ties with Northern Iraq and its Turkmen population, 
Turkish officials wanted to be effective in the reconstruction process of Iraq. But Turkey 
was excluded from this process after the Gulf War of 1991; Kurds were the “staunchest 
ally” of the U.S .From the perspective of Washington, Turkish existence in Northern Iraq 
might lead to a war between Turks and Kurds, which would destroy the democratic 
process that the U.S. wished to establish. Moreover, Americans assume that using Kurds 
would be more beneficial in Iraq than cooperation with Turkey due to the Turkish 
“sphere of influence in Iraq,” which might be to the detriment of the U.S. in the future.323  
As the Sulaymaniyah incident was examined above, it will not be re-examined 
here, but it would be useful to emphasize that this incident derailed Turkish-American 
relations in terms of mistrust, and it would take a long time to fix it. 
The main concern of Turkey in terms of Iraq was the territorial integrity of Iraq. 
The division of Iraq might have resulted in a Kurdish area in the Northern part, which 
would affect the Turkish struggle with the Kurdish separatist movement in its southern 
zone. In 2004, the developments in Iraq, in terms of the constitution and other processes 
restored some privileges to the Kurds “to the detriment of other Iraqis such as the Shi’as 
and the Turcomans.” The precious oil resources of Kirkuk and Mosul should be 
redistributed equally among the ethnic groups of Northern Iraq. To get all the benefits of 
these resources, the Kurds attempted to change the demographic conditions of Mosul and 
Kirkuk by destroying the records of the population and land registry institutions in 
March, 2004. Turkey threatened to act unilaterally towards Northern Iraq but Zalmay 
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Khalilzad, the U.S. Envoy, warned Turkey that it would be a “tragedy for the U.S.-
Turkish relations.”324Thus, Ankara refrained from any operations but pursued a 
diplomatic solution. Although American soldiers re-established public order in Mosul 
and Kirkuk, both cities had already been exposed to a demographic shift.325 
Surely the worst sticking point has been the fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 
Although reciprocal visits have been held since 2003, and mutual guarantees and 
promises have been put forward, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL is still active in Northern Iraq. 
Even though the PKK/KONGRA-GEL announced a ceasefire after Abdullah Ocalan was 
jailed in 1999, since 2004, members of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL re-launched an armed 
campaign against Turkish soldiers and citizens. Despite Ankara’s repeated calls to 
Washington to destroy PKK/KONGRA-GEL camps in Northern Iraq, Washington 
preferred to ignore the situation based on the fear of instability in other regions of Iraq 
due to an insufficiency of troops. Also, Washington refrained from alienating the Kurds 
as the stability of Iraq depended upon their help.326 After the PKK/KONGRA-GEL 
attacks towards the end of 2007 that “left 40 Turks dead,” TGNA passed a resolution 
regarding a military operation in Northern Iraq. Washington “sought to dissuade Turkey 
from taking such action” and called for reconciliation with “the regional government in 
Northern Iraq.”327 These debates ended fruitlessly.  
However, Yasar Buyukanit, former Turkish Chief of General staff, announced in 
December 2007 that a high-level of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. had been 
established and Ankara executed a hot-pursuit of the terrorists via unmanned air vehicles. 
Thus, a new trust between Turkey and the U.S. seemed to appear in terms of ongoing U.S 
operations in the region. However, the very recent attacks in Aktutun, Hakkari on 
                                                 
324 Gozen, “Causes and Consequences of Turkey’s Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003,” 94, 
quoted in Middle East International, no. 596, (March 21, 2003): 14. 
325 Ibid., 93,94. 
326 Ian O. Lesser, “The State of U.S.-Turkish Relations: Moving Beyond Geopolitics,” Colloquium 
Report: The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, Strategic Studies Institute 
(April 2008), 78. 
327 Frances G. Burwell, “Rebuilding U.S.-Turkey Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” Colloquium 
Report: The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, Strategic Studies Institute 
(April 2008), 6. 
 102
October 5, 2008 and Diyarbakir on October 8, that resulted in the deaths of fifteen 
soldiers, four police officers and one civil servant drew attention to the words of General 
Buyukanit and mistrust of the U.S once more. The cooperation against the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL began to be questioned and opened up public debates. Yet, the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL still stands as the most urgent problem waiting to be solved in 
terms of mutual cooperation. 
Consequently, approaches to Iran diverged significantly. Turkey shifted its policy 
towards Iran after the Iraq War. Apparently, Turkey’s trade with Iran boosted to “$4 
billion in 2005” from “$1 billion in 2000.” Ankara is against a strong nuclear power in its 
southern flank but does not support tough measures against Iran. As Tayyip Erdogan 
mentioned, “The continuation of Iran's nuclear program for peaceful ends is a natural 
right, but it is impossible to support it if it concerns [the development] of weapons of 
mass destruction.” Turkey also benefits from over one million Iranian tourists every 
year.328  After seeing Washington’s apparent ignorance of Turkish calls regarding the 
prevention of an independent Kurdish State, Iran and Turkey, sharing the same concerns 
on the issue, expanded cooperation in diplomatic and economic areas. Turkey supported 
counter-measures on behalf of international institutes like the UN. Ankara gave a wide 
berth to military solutions for Iran since it did not want a second Iraq case or instability 
within its borders. However, the U.S. favors military solutions rather than diplomatic 
solutions. As “McCain joins Bush in tough-talk and saber-rattling directed at Iran,”329 
they see diplomatic solutions to be fruitless. Therefore, Turkish and American 
approaches conflict over Iran. Yet, the U.S. encourages Ankara “not to reward Iran by  
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investing in its oil and gas sector.”330 Nevertheless, Turkey, having suffered a lot from 
one-sided foreign policies in the past, tends to preserve a delicate balance in its foreign 
policy towards both Iran and the U.S.  
The alleged Armenian Genocide, which the author believes should be called the 
“Armenian Relocation,” still irritates the bilateral relations. Turkey is very sensitive 
about this alleged genocide resolution mainly because it was not genocide. Secondly, the 
idea of genocide flies in the face of traditional Turkish values that have respect for every 
culture and society. In addition, as explained in the previous chapter, if the term 
“genocide” is approved, Armenians would follow a policy to take some eastern territories 
of Turkey as mentioned in Article 11 of the Armenian constitution. For this reason, after 
the Armenian’s lobbying efforts were unsuccessful, in 2000, related to passing a 
resolution about the events of 1915, the idea was again put forth in 2007. After the 
“resolution initially passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in October 2007,”331 
some high-ranking Turkish officials warned the U.S. to think twice about it. Yasar 
Buyukanit, as the Chief of General Staff at that time, said that “If this resolution passed in 
the committee passes the House as well, our military ties with the U.S. will never be the 
same again.” He also added that “an allied country does not behave in this way.”332 
However, the U.S. administration expressed their regret about the admission of the 
resolution by the committee and highlighted their opposition to the resolution. 
Washington’s opposition is based on fear of the deterioration of cooperation in Iraq as 
General David Petreus, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, warned that “…much U.S. 
military air traffic to Iraq transits through the air base at Incirlik in Turkey.”333 Although 
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Ankara did not choose any specific counter-measures in case of an approval of the 
resolution by the House of Representatives, the resolution is still pending and has not 
been submitted to the House of Representatives by Nancy Pelosi. The Turkish press 
interpreted this as Nancy Pelosi being in a dilemma, as she had promised the Armenians 
approval of the resolution, but pressures from the Bush administration outweighed her 
promise. However, unless Nancy Pelosi announces that she relinquished the proposal or 
that the House of Representatives rejects the proposal, Turkish concerns will not be 
eliminated. 
E. THE WAY AHEAD OUT OF THE BILATERAL IMPASSE 
As this author argues, despite certain periods of deterioration, Turkish-American 
relations are always moving toward improvement, because of the enduring nature of core 
interests. First of all, “Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way 
through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran.”334 In this region, 
Turkey seems the most trustworthy and powerful ally when taking into consideration the 
background of the relations. 
• Since Turkey is in the center of the heart of the American agenda-—the 
Middle East—any instability in Turkey would inevitably spread to its 
neighbors, which would never be allowed by the U.S. 
• Besides its political importance, Turkey’s geopolitical value is important 
in the eyes of policy makers in Washington because of its position as the 
center “for trade and the flow of energy to global markets.” In this context, 
Turkey’s importance is enhanced by the U.S.’ efforts to reduce the 
dependency of Western countries on Russia and Iran in terms of natural 
gas and oil. 
• Ankara’s support for the operations of the U.S. against terrorism is a vital 
factor for Washington to demonstrate to the world that this war is not 
against Muslims.  Having a population of 99 percent Muslim, a Turkish 
contribution provides a tranquillizing affect for the 1.3 billion Muslims in 
the world.335 
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• To achieve progress and stability in Iraq, a Turkish contribution looks 
inextricable. Since the U.S. would not be able to continue its existence in 
Iraq, forever, to a large extent, it would need trusted allies to maintain the 
stability in Iraq. Turkey, thinking in terms of approximation and 
trustworthiness in the environment of Iran and Syria, stand out as the best 
choice for the U.S. 
• On the other side, Washington’s support is vital for Turkey to enter the 
EU. Since America is the only hegemon in the world, nobody else can 
convince the EU to include Turkey when it needs support. Moreover,  
pressure from Washington’s may be helpful for softening some of the 
tougher policies of some European countries towards Turkey. 
• Despite an improving economy, Turkey still needs Washington’s support 
in terms of its economy. It can either be in the form of loans or via the 
IMF. Additionally, Ankara is eager to expand economic relations with the 
U.S. to accelerate its investments in Turkey. 
• After the Iraq invasion, it became clear that it would be hard for Ankara to 
carry out the fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL alone. For a successive 
solution, Ankara has to cooperate with Washington in Northern Iraq.  
• Additionally,  the Turkish Armed Forces favor warmer relations with the 
U.S. since most Turkish weapons technology depends on the U.S. In order 
to be a regional power in the midst of an unstable and cloudy zone, 
Ankara requires a powerful army with strong weapons. 
While the key aims are common, differences emerge on the way to these common 
goals. Thus, steps should be taken in order to prevent a divergence on this road. 
• To begin with, Turkish-American relations are asymmetric. “Turkey is a 
regional power,” therefore its “interests, concerns priorities, and timelines 
are primarily shaped by localized perceptions,” whereas the U.S. is a 
global power and has global concerns. This variation results in unequal 
requests. Turkish priorities fall back on Washington’s agenda and 
Washington’s requests “do not always sit well with the Turkish mindset.” 
Therefore, “a better understanding of the nature of the relationship” is 
vital. Both sides should push themselves to understand the priorities and 
sensitivities of each other so as to cruise together on the same ship.336 
• To further a stable understanding, both sides should build up consulting 
processes regarding the implementation of foreign policy to the fields of 
common interests. This was also foreseen in the document of “Shared 
Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership.” 
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• Another key idea is to expand and diversify economic relations. This 
should be implemented as a two way street. While Turkey encourages the 
American entrepreneurs via essential arrangements, the U.S. should do the 
same for Turkish entrepreneurs. By economic means, if the effects of the 
Turkish lobby are positive, it may balance the influence of the Greek and 
Armenian lobbies in Congress. 
• The Turkish and American people lack sufficient interaction. Although the 
military personnel know each other via exchanges of military agreements, 
this interaction should be dispersed throughout civil society. In this 
context, the exchange of high school and university students, the personnel 
of government institutions, “scientists and scholars”337 will generate an 
acquaintance between two peoples that will result in more friendly 
relations. 
• Lastly, the general perception in Ankara is that “Washington really does 
not have a policy toward Turkey per se.” The U.S., until today did not 
have any particular policy for Turkey. On the other hand, Washington’s 
policies toward Turkey are “derivatives of other American interests.”338 
Ankara feels uncomfortable due to the non-existence of a direct Turkish 
policy. To overcome this problem, Washington should “put Turkey at the 
center of regional diplomacy”339 regarding the Middle East, Caucasus and 
Balkans. As a result, Ankara would feel honored by Washington’s gesture 
and would push itself to be more pro-active to the advantage of the U.S. in 
the region. 
From these perspectives, Washington should guarantee Turkey in terms of the 
political and territorial integrity of Iraq, since Ankara flinches at a separatist movement in 
its southeastern territory, due to any instigation from Northern Iraq. Therefore, the U.S. 
should adhere in an unwavering fashion to the territorial integrity of Iraq. Additionally, 
Washington should lend an ear to Ankara’s calls and take them seriously regarding the 
fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. This policy is very important for Turkey, having 
suffered thirty thousand deaths since 1984. In response, Turkey should be more active 
and supportive of American policies in Iraq, which should comfort Washington in the 
long term, both economically and diplomatically. 
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Even though Turkey and the U.S. oppose a “nuclear-armed Iran,” Ankara holds 
off giving full support related to its isolation.340 Ankara refrains from getting as tough as 
the U.S. over Iran since it has developed significant economic relations with Iran. 
Nevertheless, Ankara pushes for full support of the U.S. regarding Iran via diplomatic 
solutions. by means of the UN and other international institutions. Therefore, instead of 
forcing Turkey to implement tough measures against Iran, the U.S. should seek a solution 
using international institutions that would result in Turkey’s support. With this process, 
the U.S. administration could take advantage of Turkey as an energy hub, which would 
eventually isolate Iran. Although “the Bush administration inherited” this project from his 
predecessors, it was neglected and thus failed to improve.341 Contrary to what the Bush 
administration believes, it would be useful to revitalize this project. 
Consequently, in order to prevent the Armenian and Greek lobbies from harming 
relations, the U.S. administration should be a pro-active. Congress should not proceed 
with passing the political resolution of the Armenian incidents of 1915, and this issue 
should never be considered again. The best option for this kind of solution would be to go 
through a powerful Turkish lobby in Congress. Until the establishment of a powerful 
Turkish lobby, temporary solutions should include taking advantage of the Israeli and 
other lobbies to counter the Armenian and Greek ones.  
The easiest way to conquer the heart of Ankara is to  keep the ball rolling in terms 
of supporting Turkey for the EU ticket. While Turkey pursues the goal of reaching the 
EU standards, the U.S. should be Ankara’s sponsor to prove Turkey’s eligibility and 
maturity in meeting the criteria of the EU. All the essential points mentioned above 
should construct the supports of a strong bridge in a friendly atmosphere. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Turkish-American Relations were at their lowest point in 2003. The relations 
were frustrated by the consequent shock waves: rejection of a second front resolution by 
TGNA and the Sulaymaniyah Incident. Although the future appeared cloudy at times, 
efforts toward revitalization of the relations were fruitful and eventually the trend showed 
improvement. Due to the U.S.’ interests in the Middle East, in terms of geography, 
Turkey seems the most appropriate candidate for a successful solution in the future. From 
a Turkish point of view, no one could be more helpful to a country, after a rapidly 
developing process in terms of the economic and political areas, than the U.S. 
By the way, it is interesting to note that the anti-Americanism in Turkey after 
2003 was not against American culture. Most of the polls indicated that the Turkish 
public “has sympathy towards American culture, ideas about democracy and business 
practices.” However, what the Turkish public opposed were the policies of the Bush 
administration. “According to some surveys…by Poll Mark Company…81.5 percent of 
respondents are not happy about Bush’s policies while only 5.6 percent approve of 
President Bush.”342 
Indeed, Mark R. Parris, the former U.S. Ambassador. in Ankara, confirms and 
blames the Bush Administration for mismanagement of the relations. He mainly argues 
about Bush’s “insensitivity to Turkish interests [and] Inaction against PKK/KONGRA-
GEL,”343 which gave birth to intense public opposition. Therefore, considering these 
data, it would be appropriate to underline that, in fact, the Turkish public is not an anti-
American community; it may even be pro-American in terms of democratic ideas and 
institutions.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis interprets the substance of continuity in crisis in the bilateral relations   
between Turkey and the U.S. since WWII.  At the outset, the beginning of Turkish-
American relations dating back to the early nineteenth century had been weak. From the 
end of WWII until today, the relations went through periods of improvement and 
deterioration as a result of factors in the international system. When the convergence of 
mutual interests was strong, as they were in the 1950s against a Soviet threat, the 
relations intensified in a positive sense. In contrast, when divergences of policy were 
strong as in the 1960s and 70s, related to Cyprus, the relations became “allergic and 
sensitive.” Nevertheless, as this thesis demonstrates, the relations accelerated towards the 
positive side of the meter after every episode of divergence., This fact proves that “the 
areas of convergence have been more pronounced than the areas of divergence over the 
two hundred years of connection and more than fifty years of close cooperation.”344 
A strong relationship could not be established in the 1800s as the aspects of the 
relationship were restricted to an economic dimension only. Furthermore, the geographic 
distance between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. constrained a productive and 
manifold relationship. Moreover, the nature of the decline of the Ottoman empire as well 
as the lack of  a world-wide reach of American diplomacy were additional complicating 
factors until well into the twentieth century However, those years might be assessed as 
the result of close security cooperation after WWII, when the Ottoman Empire was an 
important recipient of U.S.-made arms. 
The weak relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. ended after 
WWI because of the extinction of the Ottoman Empire. A newborn nation-state, the 
Republic of Turkey emerged from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Despite a strong 
willingness to cooperate with the U.S. emerging from Ataturk’s principles related to the 
Westernization of Turkey, the new Republic of Turkey was so busy with domestic issues  
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that these issues impeded Ankara from expanding relations with the U.S. Despite this 
fact, the sincere friendship between Ataturk and President Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
remarkable, and showed Turkish sympathy towards America. 
In contrast to the sporadic relationship before WWII, Turkish-American relations 
were boosted by the end of WWII as a result of new common threats: the Soviet Union 
and a growing U.S. interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Despite a 
close relationship at this time, it is hard to say that the relationship was built on a strategic 
concept. The U.S. became a kind of “big brother” to Turkey as British influence in the 
region went into decline. Washington set Ankara up with military supplies and in return, 
Ankara stood against the expansionist goals of the Soviet Union. The relationship was on 
track until the U.S. administration signed an agreement with the Soviet Union regarding 
the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in 1962. However, it did not produce a 
significant divergence in the relations due to the positive efforts of the Turkish 
Parliament. 
Consequently, the letter by President Johnson in 1964, which related to the 
cancellation of the intervention attempt of Turkey into Cyprus, was the deepest shock in 
the history of U.S.-Turkish relations. Since the President’s tone was very harsh in the 
letter, it caused a great deal of anti-American feeling among Turkish citizens. This 
negative wave became even bigger when the U.S. administration pressured Ankara to put 
a ban on opium production. Moreover, the arms embargo that was put on Turkey by 
Congress, as a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, brought the ties to the 
point of unraveling. 
After experiencing the beginning of this unraveling, as this thesis presents, the 
relations were regulated once again. The re-emergence of the Soviet threat in the 1980s 
adducted the two countries back to each other. This time, Turkey was eager to expand 
relations from security to economic and political areas. The First Gulf War provided this 
opportunity for Turkey and a diverse relationship was launched. During President 
Clinton’s administration, mutual cooperation reached its peak. After 9/11, cooperation 
became more important and meaningful in terms of the common fight against terrorism. 
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After 9/11, in terms of the fight against terrorism, Turkey pursued a balanced 
relationship with the U.S. in the context of mutual benefits and compliance with 
international institutions like the UN. On the other hand, the Bush administration acted 
on its own, regardless of the international institutions, which resulted in an uncomfortable 
situation in Turkey and with its European allies. Subsequently, Paul Wolfowitz’s public 
denunciations of Turkey, and President Bush’s unfriendly tone regarding the situation in 
Northern Iraq after the Turkish Parliament rejected the American proposal of a second 
Turkish/Iraq front on March 1, 2003,  the relations began to spiral downwards. After the 
incident of July 4, 2003 in Sulaymaniyah, the word coming from most of the Turkish 
citizens was “enough: this is the end.” At this time, the situation was at its worst. The 
close relationship and “distinctive alliance”345 of the years was about to go down the 
drain.  
Even though this step was interpreted as the beginning of deterioration and a 
detaching process, the future reversed the interpretations and accelerated towards the 
better.. Mutual visits, an enhanced partnership, and a deeper reciprocal understanding 
overwhelmed the impaired parts of the relationship. “Shared vision” and the cooperation 
over the PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist organization were the most fruitful products of 
this recently advanced partnership. 
As this thesis demonstrates, the relations in the last fifty years experienced ups 
and downs of policy and strategy. But the important point is that the two countries never 
broke up their security alliance despite highly difficult issues of policy, be it in the 1960s, 
the 1970s, or in the immediate past. Any deterioration was followed by an improvement. 
This proves that Turkish-American relations tend to improvement despite some periods 
of deterioration as both countries share the common core interests mentioned in the 
chapters above. Hence, in contrast to the scenarios of doomsday after 2003 proffered by 
many critics on both sides, the alliance did not come to an end, but began to improve 
again,  the signals of which are clear today. It should be acknowledged that impaired 
relations do not mean the end of an alliance, since members of an alliance do not have to 
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share exactly the same points of view. Divergences on certain issues might sometimes be 
inevitable. Nevertheless, in a world of rapid change and diverse interests, Washington’s 
new policies toward some of the Middle East countries, like Iran, Syria and Iraq, push for 
a strong alliance with a trusted ally, Turkey. In an environment where benefits outweigh 
term and region regarding an alliance with Turkey, from the author’s point of view, the 
divergences would not be as important. Yet this does not mean that there will be no 
divergence in interests, only that they will not be at the top of the agenda. They will be 
taken into consideration secondarily, after the benefits.  
Finally, the author would like to quote Ataturk’s calling to the American people, 
which demonstrates the close and positive relationship and the core shared principles 
between Turkey and the U.S.  
Dearest Americans, I would like to mention a few words about the natural 
origin of the undeniable sincere relationship between the people of Turkey 
and those of the United States of America. The Turks are already a 
Democratic Nation. If this true fact has not been understood by today’s 
civilized world I must direct attention to the remarkable comments made 
by our ambassador regarding the last days of the Ottoman Empire. On the 
other hand the American people have always relied and depended on 
democracy to identify them as a nation since their inception. It has been 
through this blessing that they have been placed amongst today’s civilized 
world as a new nation. This has given them acceptance as a new nation. 
Thus the Turkish people feel a strong sentiment of love and understanding 
towards the American people. I do hope that the observation of this fact 
will encourage further dialog and warm relations between the two nations; 
but this will not be all. I am sure that this will also allow the rest of the 
civilized world to have more goodwill towards one another and erase all 
past negative fables and experiences, thus leading the world towards a 
more peaceful and lawful existence. Dear Americans; as a proud 
representative of the Turkish nation I give you this as a goal and sole 
purpose of the new Turkish people. I have no doubt that the American 
nation who has already reached this ultimate goal shall understand and 
join the new Turkish nation.346 
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Taking Ataturk’s words into consideration, Turkey and the U.S. should cooperate 
on a wide range of issues, as there are far more common viewpoints than divergences. 
For this reason, a positive prediction in terms of improvement for the future of the 
relations would not be wrong.  
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